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Abstract
My dissertation consists of three chapters, where the common theme among them is debt
and saving. My work contributes to our understanding of how debt markets function for entre-
preneurs, large corporations and households.
The first chapter studies how entrepreneurs used personal borrowing to fund their busines-
ses during the Great Recession. One of the defining characteristics of this period was a “credit
crunch” during which the supply of credit dropped for all borrowers. I show that changes in
the finances of entrepreneurs between 2007 and 2009 are consistent with entrepreneurs using
personal assets to secure lending for their businesses and overcome this credit crunch. In parti-
cular, I find that home equity loan balances increased by 10%, despite a 12% drop in the value
of aggregate housing stock. Entrepreneurs were responsible for 76% of the increase in home
equity loan balances, while they only represent 13% of the population.
In the second chapter, I study the use of credit ratings by large corporations in the bond
market. Over the last 25 years, there has been a drastic change in the distribution of corporate
bond ratings: between 1985 and 2010 the number of firms issuing AAA or AA-rated debt
dropped by 70%, while the number of firms issuing debt with lower ratings increased. I propose
a mechanism whereby investors learn about firms through credit ratings and publicly available
financial information and develop a model that incorporates this mechanism such that firms
must devote resources to improving their rating. Under general conditions, the number of
high-rated firms decreases in response to an increase in public signal accuracy.
The third chapter explores the role of financial market access on household consumption
inequality. The standard macroeconomic models of consumption and saving with stochastic
income processes have failed to match the rise in consumption inequality between 1980 and
2004. I present a model with idiosyncratic earnings risk and endogenous market segmentation
between incomplete and complete markets for financial assets. This model improves upon
the qualitative predictions regarding between-group and within-group consumption inequality
of a standard incomplete markets model and a standard complete markets model with limited
commitment.
Keywords: Macroeconomics, debt, entrepreneurs, credit ratings, bonds, inequality
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My dissertation consists of three chapters, where the common theme among them is debt and
saving. Each is a study of a different sphere of the economy: entrepreneurs, large corporations
and households. My work contributes to our understanding of how debt markets function for
each of these three groups.
The first chapter studies how entrepreneurs used their personal assets to fund their business
during the financial crisis. I use panel data with rich information on household finances to show
that entrpereneurs’ reliance on home equity loans increased during the financial crisis. I further
show that homeownership and borrowing against home equity increase the probability of survi-
val. Though entrepreneurs were able to use home equity loans to survive the Great Recession,
it was not costless since the increase in home equity borrowing exposed more household wealth
to business risk at the height of the recession. Considering the influence entrepreneurs have on
growth and employment (see, for example, Adelino, Schoar, & Severino, 2012), policies that
ease borrowing constraints for entrepreneurs could potentially improve aggregate conditions
during periods of tightened credit conditions.
The second chapter studies the use of credit ratings by large corporations in the bond mar-
ket. I find that the virtual disappearance of firms with the highest credit ratings since 1985
was caused by increased dissemination and reliability of public information on firms brought
about by the digital age. This lowers the value of credit ratings as “calling cards” of a firm’s
overall quality, as high credit ratings are costly to attain, and disseminating public information
is not. Understanding how firms use credit ratings is important as regulation of the credit rating
agencies has become a pressing policy issue following the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
The third chapter explores the role of financial market access on household consumption
inequality. I present a model with endogenous segmentation in the market for financial assets.
Restricted access to complete markets, which allow for full consumption insurance, captures
the well-documented rise in consumption inequality between 1980 and 2004, which standard
1
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macroeconomic models of consumption and saving have failed to match. It is important to
study economic inequality as it bears directly on policy concerns such as education and social
security. Most of the existing literature has focused on the inequality of income or wealth.
This is surprising as consumption, not income or wealth, is included in the household objective
function and thus it should be of primary concern.
Chapter 2: Entrepreneurs’ Use of Home Equity Loans During Credit Crises
One of the defining characteristics of the Great Recession was a credit crunch. The supply
of credit dropped for all borrowers: individuals, corporations, small businesses and even go-
vernments. Many have argued (e.g. Duygan-Bump et al. [2010], and Ivashina & Scharfstein
[2010]) that the supply of credit was especially limited during this period for businesses. In
particular, for small businesses this credit crunch manifested itself in two ways: (1) small busi-
ness loans made by commercial banks declined and (2) banks tightened lending standards for
small businesses. As evidence, Duygan-Bump et al. (2010) document that small business loans
made by commercial banks declined by $40 billion between June, 2008 and March, 2010, and,
according to the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, there were
13 consecutive quarters of tightening lending standards to small businesses.1 These changes
likely resulted in decreased investment, smaller payrolls and a decrease in the net rate of firm
creation.
Without the ability to borrow, entrepreneurs would find it difficult to operate their busi-
nesses effectively and, in the worst cases, survive. Similarly, potential entrepreneurs would
have difficulty starting a new business. As business lending dries up, entrepreneurs that are
able to borrow using personal assets as collateral would be able to alleviate the pressures of
a credit crunch. I show that changes in the finances of entrepreneurs between 2007 and 2009
are consistent with entrepreneurs using personal assets to secure lending for their businesses.
In particular, I find that home equity loan balances increased by 10% ($73 billion), despite the
large reduction in house prices that was a hallmark of the Great Recession.2 Furthermore, du-
ring this period total consumer debt dropped slightly, suggesting that home equity loans were
not simply another channel through which to borrow during a period of economic turmoil.3
Interestingly, entrepreneurs were disproportionately responsible for 76% ($56 billion) of the
increase in home equity loan balances, while they only represent 13% of the population. All
told, entrepreneurs held 33% of aggregate home equity loan balances in 2007 and held 41% in
1More specifically, the first fact is a measure of the impact of the fall in supply, while the second is a measure
of a tightening supply curve itself.
2After reaching its peak in 2007, by 2009 the value of aggregate housing stock had dropped by 12%.
3Knotek II & Braxton (2012) document a decrease in total consumer debt in every quarter but one since 2009.
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2009, a large change in the distribution of this debt considering the short horizon. I argue that
entrepreneurs used personal loans to supplement business loans, and thus increased borrowing
against home equity is evidence of tighter credit constraints for entrepreneurs.
Not all entrepreneurs could borrow against their home equity, but those that could were able
to mitigate the effects of the credit crunch. In support of this, I find that the entrepreneurs that
survived had more personal assets in the form of home equity than those that exited.4 Specifi-
cally, entrepreneurs that exited in 2009 had lower rates of homeownership and less home equity
than surviving entrepreneurs during the crisis, suggesting that personal assets had an important
effect on the ability to survive during the Great Recession. Surviving entrepreneurs had on
average 62% more home equity and 51% more valuable homes than did exiters. Furthermore,
homeowners were less likely to exit: of 2007 entrepreneurs, by 2009 18% of homeowners had
exited, as opposed to 28% of non-homeowners. Surviving entrepreneurs increased borrowing
against the value of their homes, whereas it decreased for exiters, an indication that entrepre-
neurs used home equity loans to finance their business. Also, the frequency of home equity
loan use increased for survivors, but decreased for exiters. This leads me to conclude 2007 en-
trepreneurs substituted private lending, in the form of home equity loans, for business lending
during the credit crisis.
Another manifestation of this phenomena is that entrepreneurs that started during the loo-
ser credit conditions of 2007 needed less home equity than those that entered during the credit
crunch in 2009, a change in the pool of new entrepreneurs.5 I compare entrants in 2007 before
the crisis and entrants during the crisis in 2009. To consistently identify entrants in 2007 and
2009, I supplement the SCF panel with the typical SCF cross-section in 2007, which has more
detailed data on respondents’ businesses. I then classify an entrepreneur as new if they entered
entrepreneurship in the two years preceding their interview. Reflecting tightened credit stan-
dards in 2009, 2007 entrants had less valuable homes (20%) and less home equity (63%) than
2009 entrants. As such, 2009 entrants had more housing wealth, despite house prices falling.
This housing wealth was also more readily accessible to 2009 entrants: the number of entrants
with an established home equity line of credit (HELOC) was two and a half times larger and
limits increased by 17%. These findings are robust to controlling for the size of the business, as
4As is well documented, most recently by Wolff (2010), the home is typically a household’s most valuable
asset. As such, it is the primary source for collateral against personal loans, and so I focus on this asset in my
analysis. In the SCF, averaging over all households, house value was 42% of total household assets in 2007 and
43% in 2009.
5Buera, Kaboski & Shin (2011) show that financial frictions account for a substantial fraction of the differences
in cross-country TFP. Many studies, such as Hseih & Klenow (2009) and Banerjee & Duflo (2005), suggest that
total potential TFP losses due to input misallocation are large. However, Midrigan & Xu (2013) find that financial
frictions distort the entry decision for firms and that this channel, as opposed to the misallocation of capital, is
responsible for the majority of the financial-friction induced differences in cross-country TFP.
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measured by both the number of employees and business value using a probit model. Given the
results for incumbent entrepreneurs, one might expect the homeownership rate for new entre-
preneurs to be higher in 2009 during the crisis than in 2007 after the crisis, as tightened credit
standards could preclude non-homeowners, more than homeowners, from starting a business.
In fact, the homeownership rate is roughly constant over these two years. Though the pro-
portion of homeowners and non-homeowners didn’t change, non-homeowners seemingly were
affected by the credit crisis, as the value of businesses started by non-homeowners in 2009 was
drastically smaller than those started in 2007 by the same group.
To study how entrepreneurs used personal assets during the credit crunch, I employ the
2007-2009 panel edition of the Survey of Consumer Finances. This unique dataset is ideal for
such a study as 2007 respondents were re-interviewed in 2009, and so it details the finances of
households before and during the crisis. Furthermore, respondents are asked directly if they
“actively manage” any owned business, which is how I define entrepreneurship.6 The SCF also
over-samples rich households, which include a large share of entrepreneurs,7 and provides rich
micro-data on household assets, debts and incomes.
Respondents in this data are not asked to specify the intended use of funds.8 So, though the
results suggest that entrepreneurs are using increased borrowing to fund their businesses, I do
not directly observe that this is the case. Other studies, such as Herkenhoff, Phillips & Cohen-
Cole (2016) and Adelino, Schoar & Severino (2013) also suffer from this limitation and reach
similar conclusions, namely that observed changes in borrowing patterns imply that borrowing
was used for business purposes. More directly, Robb & Robinson (2012) study the Kauffman
Survey and determine that personal borrowing is an important source of start-up funding for
many entrepreneurs.
Chapter 3: The Role of Public Information and Credit Ratings in the Corporate Bond
Market
Firms with AAA credit ratings are disappearing. While in 1985 there were 34 firms with a
AAA rating, by 2011 there were only 4.9 The decline in top rated debt has also taken place at
the AA level; between 1985 and 2010 the number of firms issuing AAA or AA debt dropped
by 70%, while the number of firms issuing A or BBB debt increased by 77% and those issuing
6In most surveys, respondents are asked if they are self-employed or own a business and so cannot distinguish
between the two. An example of this is the Current Population Survey.
7The correlation between wealth and entrepreneurship is documented in Gentry & Hubbard (2004), for in-
stance.
8The SCF does ask if the respondent has used personal guarantees or collateral to secure business financing,
though responses are not tied to any specific debt.
9The four firms, as rated by Standard & Poor’s, are Johnson & Johnson, Automatic Data Processing Inc.,
Microsoft Corp. and Exxon Mobil Corp.
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speculative grade debt increased by 129%. Overall the number of firms with a bond rating
increased by 59%.
Why is the ratings distribution shifting towards more mediocre ratings? The answer to this
question is important as bonds are now a larger share of corporate liabilities. In the Federal
Reserve Board Flow of Funds Data, the share of total liabilities held in bonds grew by 26.5%
between 1985 and 2010. Corporations are increasingly choosing bond and equity financing
over other securities and bank financing.10 Furthermore, the size the corporate bond market
is massive; nonfinancial corporations had $4,691 billion of outstanding bond debt in 2010.11
Considering the size and growth of this market, the underlying cause of the ratings shift may
have a substantial effect on capital markets.
Credit ratings are ostensibly used by investors to determine how likely a firm is to default
on its outstanding debt. Firms with AAA credit ratings are less likely to default than those
rated AA, A, and so forth. On top of this, credit ratings are also a signal of the firm’s general
competence, as it is very difficult to achieve the highest ratings. As these ratings are useful to
investors, firms will consult with ratings agencies prior to selling their debt.12
In part, the need for credit ratings is regulatory: many large, institutional investors are
required to hold only investment grade bonds (BBB or higher). Additionally, it is difficult for
firms to credibly relay this information directly to investors, and the auditing process would be
very onerous for an individual investor. Thus the credit rating agencies are able to exploit some
efficiencies of scale. There is a trade-off for firms however: they must devote resources to non-
productive ratings activities in order to satisfy the requirements of the credit rating agencies,
on top of the fee for the rating service itself.13 For instance, a firm is required to hold cash on
hand to satisfy the requirements for a particular rating. If credit ratings were not required to
sell corporate bonds, firms might be able to reallocate their resources to increase profits.
Considering the value of a credit rating, a natural question arises: why are the highly rated
firms disappearing? I argue that firms are no longer willing to pay the cost to achieve high
ratings. To this point:
“Scores of big companies have lost their AAA status in recent years as it became
seen in board rooms as more of a straitjacket than a path to riches.”
(Eric Dash, New York Times, August 2, 2011)
To capture this change, I propose the following mechanism. As credit ratings have value as
10The change in share of total corporate liabilities was 20.7%, -76.7%, and -67.1% for equity, securities and
bank financing, respectively.
11$7,167 billion outstanding at the end of 2016, per the most recent data available.
12Though it is possible to issue debt without consulting with a credit ratings agency, almost all firms do.
Nevertheless, both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s will issue a rating regardless of the firm’s participation.
13This is typically a percentage of the size of the bond issue.
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a signal of firm “quality” in the sense that they provide investors with information about the
future performance of the firm, they are an alternative to other publicly available channels of
firm information. These channels include SEC 10K filings, which contain pertinent financial
data from public firms and are now provided electronically, as well as media such as the Wall
Street Journal Online and Bloomberg. With the proliferation of this information, investors
now have direct access to firm information which may convince them to purchase lower-rated
bonds. Firms no longer need to rely solely on a credit rating as a signal of their type, as the
demand for their bonds is now also dependent on this costless, public channel.
The topic was originally discussed in the financial press, from whom multiple answers
emerged. Besides firms’ unwillingness to pay for improved ratings, other suggestions include
investors having a larger appetite for risk so they are more willing to purchase lower rated
bonds, and investors no longer placing much stock in corporate bond ratings. Though see-
mingly disparate, I argue that these three answers are essentially the same. Firms will lower
their rating and reduce the associated costs if they are able to sell their debt at a lower rating.
This would be possible if the demand for lower investment grade bonds has increased relative
to high investment grade bonds. In effect, there is lower demand for top ratings from both
investors and firms.
To formalize this story, I construct a model that contains a “peacock” problem: the firm
must divert resources to non-productive rating activities in order to improve its expected credit
rating. Firms are endowed with a project and differ only in the probability that this project will
pay off with the higher return. Both the credit rating and a costless public signal are correlated
with the firm’s type. This type is unknown to everyone, including the firm. As the firm learns
something about its type from the public signal, this will influence the decision to invest in the
rating process. Once this decision is made, a credit rating is formed. Knowing the public signal
and the credit rating, investors then decide whether to invest in the firm’s project. To capture
the proliferation of information over the period in question, I increase the correlation of the
public signal with a firm’s type (the “accuracy” of the signal). Under general conditions, the
resulting change in the distribution of credit ratings matches the change observed in the data.
The mechanism works as follows. Investors are unable to observe an individual firm’s
type but have access to credit ratings and the public signal. Firms with projects that have a
higher expected payoff will be more likely to receive a high public signal and more likely to
earn a high rating. The investors are then able to offer lower interest rates to those firms with
higher ratings and signals. Additionally, a higher rating will increase the probability that a firm
receives an investment. As the accuracy of the signal increases, firms and investors learn more
about the type of the firm, which may induce firms to forego investing to achieve a high rating.
In equilibrium, an increase in the accuracy of the public signal will result in fewer firms with
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high ratings and more firms with mediocre and low ratings.
The primary testable implication of the model is the increase in the dispersion of interest
rates within a rating class. When the accuracy of the public signal is low, the interest rates given
to two firms with the same rating and different signals will be closer than when the accuracy is
high. In effect, the difference between interest rates increases with the accuracy of the signal
as investors are more sure that these firms have different underlying types. Using data from the
Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database, I show that this pattern is borne out between 1990
and 2010.
In all markets, the rating system is designed to measure relative credit risk. The credit
rating agencies (CRAs) assert that a rating does not measure absolute default probability and
that a rating does not constitute investment advice. The purpose of this position is to ensure
protection from liability claims and to continue their status as a Nationally Recognized Statis-
tical Rating Organization (NRSRO). This designation is important as only ratings from such
an organization may be used to satisfy legal obligations as to which debt may be held by large,
institutional investors. An example of such an investor is a pension fund which is required to
hold only investment grade debt.14 Another example is any bank that has committed itself to
the Basel Accords, which specify a capital requirement based on the rating composition of the
bank’s assets.
Chapter 4: Consumption Insurance with Endogenously Segmented Markets
The household consumption-savings decision and consumption inequality have been impor-
tant areas of research in economics, but some aspects remain unexplored to their full extent.
In particular, I focus on the different level of access that households have to financial markets,
the effect this has on household savings and investment, and what this means for consumption
inequality. In this paper, differential access is caused by costs which are not proportional to
income and thus cause heterogeneous behaviour across income levels. The motivation for this
study comes from, in part, the empirical rejection of perfect risk sharing, i.e., that households
are able to insure against all idiosyncratic shocks.15 By adding a fixed cost for market partici-
pation, I show that the model exhibits the desired degree of risk sharing by controlling access
on the extensive margin, while allowing income-rich households full consumption insurance.
This further restricts the degree of risk sharing relative to the debt constraint models (discussed
below) on an aggregate level. From a theoretical standpoint, the benefit of this fixed cost is that
14Debt is considered investment grade if it has a rating of BBB or above. Debt rated BB or lower is deemed
speculative grade or high yield.
15See, for example, Attanasio & Davis (1996) who show that the standard Arrow-Debreu complete markets
model cannot explain the joint distribution of earnings and consumption in U.S. cross-sectional data.
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the market segmentation is endogenous and thus households can pay for access at any point in
their lifetime.
The model of Endogenously Segmented Markets (ESM) developed herein exhibits a mix-
ture of perfect risk sharing and no risk sharing in different segments of the economy. In order
to justify such a model, there should be evidence of two features: heterogeneous market parti-
cipation and a fixed cost for access. The former can be seen in the high concentration of asset
holdings and wealth in the upper portion of the income distribution. Wolff (2010) finds that the
top quintile by income holds 44% of their net worth in real estate, business equity, stock and
bonds compared to 14% for the middle 3 quintiles in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
in 2007. Furthermore, the author finds that 55% of the total value of life insurance is held
by the top 10%. Studying the same sample, Guvenen (2007a) finds that 90% of non-housing
wealth and 98% of stocks are owned by the richest 20% of the U.S. population by income. By
most measures, the distribution of assets is heavily skewed to the left.
A fixed cost for access is not so easily observed. Following Guvenen (2007a), it is meant to
capture both implicit and explicit costs endured by those who trade in financial markets. These
would include time and effort costs of tasks that include filing a more complicated tax return,
membership or access costs to internet trading houses, brokerage fees that aren’t “per trade”
and costs of information acquisition. Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) finds that modest costs ($50 to
$260) are enough to explain the decision of most non-participants in the stock market.
The basic models on household consumption and savings fall into two classes. The first are
the incomplete market models such as Aiyagari (1994) or Huggett (1993) in which infinitely-
lived households use “precautionary savings” to smooth their consumption. More recently,
Storesletten, Telmer & Yaron (2004) use the same framework in a life-cycle model. Though
this market structure is useful as a lower bound for the asset set of an entire economy, there
are clearly more opportunities to smooth consumption (such as disability insurance and ot-
her financial instruments). Saving with a single bond is arguably a more apt description of
low-income household behaviour, as this group rarely holds their wealth in assets other than
their primary residence. This can be seen in the SCF where households with income under
$15,000 in 2007 make up 13.3% of households but hold only 1.2% of total stock holdings,
either indirectly or directly. In the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the asset income
of households that earn more than $30,000 is over three times that of those that earn less than
$30,000. The second class of models, such as the model studied in Kehoe & Levine (1993), re-
strict asset purchases in a more natural manner: debt constraints. In these models a household
(or an agent) cannot commit to paying back any amount of debt which would make autarky
more appealing, though they have access to assets which span the state space. In this sense, risk
sharing is restricted on the intensive margin, i.e., households cannot borrow or lend as much as
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they wish but may purchase assets for every state.16
Krueger & Perri (2006) determine that the degree of risk sharing in the economy would
seem to be in between that of a simple bond economy (incomplete markets) and an economy
with limited commitment (restricted complete markets). The authors come to this conclusion
as the increase in consumption variance from 1980 to 2004, as measured in the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX), is lower than that predicted by a bond economy and higher than
that predicted by a debt-constrained economy.17 It may be, however, that each of the basic
models accurately describes a certain segment of the economy, while inaccurately describing
the economy as a whole. As mentioned above, the single bond economy seems to suitably
describe the behaviour of low-income households, while the observed wealth holdings of high-
income households indicates that they have access to a wider class of assets.
It is important to study economic inequality as it bears directly on policy concerns such
as education and social security. Most of the existing literature has focused on the inequality
of income or wealth and ignored, to a certain degree, the inequality of consumption. This
is surprising as consumption, not income or wealth, is included in the household objective
function and thus it should be of primary concern. A recent paper by Heathcoate, Perri & Vi-
olante (2010) documents the economic inequality in the United States by examining changes
in the variance of wages, hours worked, income, earnings and consumption. The authors find
that the increase in consumption inequality is less than that of income inequality and suggest
that this implies some part of the income process is insurable, but not all.18 This is only true
if, in response to rising income variance, all households behave in a similar fashion which I
argue is not the case. The main result of this paper is that the observed increase in consump-
tion inequality misrepresents the true welfare effect of an increase in income variance. This is
because the increase in income variance has two effects on the unconditional variance of log
consumption: (1) an increase in group risk sharing for high income households (as group mar-
ket participation increases), resulting in lower consumption variance; and (2) a direct increase
in consumption variance for low income households, as the fixed cost is more restrictive and
market participation does not increase.
To further develop the ESM model, I examine the effects of a change in the persistence of
income shocks. An increase in persistence will decrease the risk faced by a household, as it is
subject to fewer shocks but will also increase the difference in lifetime utility caused by a high
16Kocherlakota (1996) shows that complete risk sharing is in fact possible in this environment if agents are
sufficiently patient.
17I refer to the within-group (log of) consumption variance. The between-group variance is lower in the data
than both of the basic models. The within-group variance is of more interest as it reflects the level of risk sharing
in the economy.
18The authors also confirm that the samples used by the PSID, CEX and CPS are comparable, lending justifi-
cation to the use of income and consumption data from the different surveys in the same study.
Chapter 1. Introduction 10
or low income shock. The model predicts a decrease in market participation when persistence
is raised, suggesting that in this environment the former effect is more important for household
welfare. Finally, I show that when the financial markets are interpreted as traditional insu-
rance markets (such as for disability or life insurance), the ESM model supports two empirical
observations which are seemingly opposed: namely, the negative correlation between income
and insurance purchases and the positive correlation between wealth and insurance purcha-
ses. The intuition is that wealth is used for precautionary savings which become redundant for
households that can afford the fixed cost of market participation.
Chapter 2
Entrepreneurs’ Use of Home Equity
Loans During the Great Recession
2.1 Introduction
One of the defining characteristics of the Great Recession was a credit crunch. The supply
of credit dropped for all borrowers: individuals, corporations, small businesses and even go-
vernments. Many have argued (e.g. Duygan-Bump et al. [2010], and Ivashina & Scharfstein
[2010]) that the supply of credit was especially limited during this period for businesses. In
particular, for small businesses this credit crunch manifested itself in two ways: (1) small busi-
ness loans made by commercial banks declined and (2) banks tightened lending standards for
small businesses. As evidence, Duygan-Bump et al. (2010) document that small business loans
made by commercial banks declined by $40 billion between June, 2008 and March, 2010, and,
according to the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, there were
13 consecutive quarters of tightening lending standards to small businesses.1 These changes
likely resulted in decreased investment, smaller payrolls and a decrease in the net rate of firm
creation.
Without the ability to borrow, entrepreneurs would find it difficult to operate their busi-
nesses effectively and, in the worst cases, survive. Similarly, potential entrepreneurs would
have difficulty starting a new business. As business lending dries up, entrepreneurs that are
able to borrow using personal assets as collateral would be able to alleviate the pressures of
a credit crunch. I show that changes in the finances of entrepreneurs between 2007 and 2009
are consistent with entrepreneurs using personal assets to secure lending for their businesses.
In particular, I find that home equity loan balances increased by 10% ($73 billion), despite the
1More specifically, the first fact is a measure of the impact of the fall in supply, while the second is a measure
of a tightening supply curve itself.
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large reduction in house prices that was a hallmark of the Great Recession.2 Furthermore, du-
ring this period total consumer debt dropped slightly, suggesting that home equity loans were
not simply another channel through which to borrow during a period of economic turmoil.3
Interestingly, entrepreneurs were disproportionately responsible for 76% ($56 billion) of the
increase in home equity loan balances, while they only represent 13% of the population. All
told, entrepreneurs held 33% of aggregate home equity loan balances in 2007 and held 41% in
2009, a large change in the distribution of this debt considering the short horizon. I argue that
entrepreneurs used personal loans to supplement business loans, and thus increased borrowing
against home equity is evidence of tighter credit constraints for entrepreneurs.
Not all entrepreneurs could borrow against their home equity, but those that could were able
to mitigate the effects of the credit crunch. In support of this, I find that the entrepreneurs that
survived had more personal assets in the form of home equity than those that exited.4 Specifi-
cally, entrepreneurs that exited in 2009 had lower rates of homeownership and less home equity
than surviving entrepreneurs during the crisis, suggesting that personal assets had an important
effect on the ability to survive during the Great Recession. Surviving entrepreneurs had on
average 62% more home equity and 51% more valuable homes than did exiters. Furthermore,
homeowners were less likely to exit: of 2007 entrepreneurs, by 2009 18% of homeowners had
exited, as opposed to 28% of non-homeowners. Surviving entrepreneurs increased borrowing
against the value of their homes, whereas it decreased for exiters, an indication that entrepre-
neurs used home equity loans to finance their business. Also, the frequency of home equity
loan use increased for survivors, but decreased for exiters. This leads me to conclude 2007 en-
trepreneurs substituted private lending, in the form of home equity loans, for business lending
during the credit crisis.
Another manifestation of this phenomena is that entrepreneurs that started during the loo-
ser credit conditions of 2007 needed less home equity than those that entered during the credit
crunch in 2009, a change in the pool of new entrepreneurs.5 I compare entrants in 2007 before
the crisis and entrants during the crisis in 2009. To consistently identify entrants in 2007 and
2009, I supplement the SCF panel with the typical SCF cross-section in 2007, which has more
2After reaching its peak in 2007, by 2009 the value of aggregate housing stock had dropped by 12%.
3Knotek II & Braxton (2012) document a decrease in total consumer debt in every quarter but one since 2009.
4As is well documented, most recently by Wolff (2010), the home is typically a household’s most valuable
asset. As such, it is the primary source for collateral against personal loans, and so I focus on this asset in my
analysis. In the SCF, averaging over all households, house value was 42% of total household assets in 2007 and
43% in 2009.
5Buera, Kaboski & Shin (2011) show that financial frictions account for a substantial fraction of the differences
in cross-country TFP. Many studies, such as Hseih & Klenow (2009) and Banerjee & Duflo (2005), suggest that
total potential TFP losses due to input misallocation are large. However, Midrigan & Xu (2013) find that financial
frictions distort the entry decision for firms and that this channel, as opposed to the misallocation of capital, is
responsible for the majority of the financial-friction induced differences in cross-country TFP.
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detailed data on respondents’ businesses. I then classify an entrepreneur as new if they entered
entrepreneurship in the two years preceding their interview. Reflecting tightened credit stan-
dards in 2009, 2007 entrants had less valuable homes (20%) and less home equity (63%) than
2009 entrants. As such, 2009 entrants had more housing wealth, despite house prices falling.
This housing wealth was also more readily accessible to 2009 entrants: the number of entrants
with an established home equity line of credit (HELOC) was two and a half times larger and
limits increased by 17%. These findings are robust to controlling for the size of the business, as
measured by both the number of employees and business value using a probit model. Given the
results for incumbent entrepreneurs, one might expect the homeownership rate for new entre-
preneurs to be higher in 2009 during the crisis than in 2007 after the crisis, as tightened credit
standards could preclude non-homeowners, more than homeowners, from starting a business.
In fact, the homeownership rate is roughly constant over these two years. Though the pro-
portion of homeowners and non-homeowners didn’t change, non-homeowners seemingly were
affected by the credit crisis, as the value of businesses started by non-homeowners in 2009 was
drastically smaller than those started in 2007 by the same group.
To study how entrepreneurs used personal assets during the credit crunch, I employ the
2007-2009 panel edition of the Survey of Consumer Finances. This unique dataset is ideal for
such a study as 2007 respondents were re-interviewed in 2009, and so it details the finances of
households before and during the crisis. Furthermore, respondents are asked directly if they
“actively manage” any owned business, which is how I define entrepreneurship.6 The SCF also
over-samples rich households, which include a large share of entrepreneurs,7 and provides rich
micro-data on household assets, debts and incomes.
Respondents in this data are not asked to specify the intended use of funds.8 So, though the
results suggest that entrepreneurs are using increased borrowing to fund their businesses, I do
not directly observe that this is the case. Other studies, such as Herkenhoff, Phillips & Cohen-
Cole (2016) and Adelino, Schoar & Severino (2013) also suffer from this limitation and reach
similar conclusions, namely that observed changes in borrowing patterns imply that borrowing
was used for business purposes. More directly, Robb & Robinson (2012) study the Kauffman
Survey and determine that personal borrowing is an important source of start-up funding for
many entrepreneurs.
The study of financial constraints as they relate to entrepreneurship goes back at least to
6In most surveys, respondents are asked if they are self-employed or own a business and so cannot distinguish
between the two. An example of this is the Current Population Survey.
7The correlation between wealth and entrepreneurship is documented in Gentry & Hubbard (2004), for in-
stance.
8The SCF does ask if the respondent has used personal guarantees or collateral to secure business financing,
though responses are not tied to any specific debt.
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Evans & Jovanovic (1989), who studied a model of entrepreneurial entry and investment with
collateral constraints.9 As wealthy individuals are less likely to be constrained, they are more
likely to become entrepreneurs if financing constraints bind. This implication is supported
empirically by studies such as Gentry & Hubbard (2004), who find entrepreneurs own a sub-
stantial fraction of aggregate wealth. More recently, Schmalz, Sraer & Thesmar (2017) show
that collateral constraints restrict firm entry and lower growth thereafter.10 However, Hurst &
Lusardi (2004) find that this relationship is non-linear as the entrepreneurship rate is flat up
to the 80th percentile of wealth but increasing thereafter.11 This finding has been challenged
recently in studies such as Fairley & Krashinsky (2012), who find evidence of financing con-
straints for new entrepreneurs throughout the wealth distribution. In this paper, I find evidence
of binding financing constraints for new and incumbent entrepreneurs.
Though the literature has focused on entrants, an exception is Cagetti & De Nardi (2006),
who study a model where entrepreneurs choose entry, exit and investment. They find that
borrowing constraints affect not only the entry and exit decisions, but also firm size and invest-
ment. In particular, tighter borrowing constraints lower the fraction of entrepreneurs and reduce
average firm size. Buera (2009) also considers both the intensive and extensive margins and
finds that the welfare costs of financing constraints are primarily caused by underinvestment in
realized projects as opposed to forgoing potentially profitable projects.
Financing for entrepreneurs can be divided into two categories: (1) traditional business lo-
ans, from banks or other sources, and perhaps secured with assets owned by the business or
future sales, for instance; and (2) personal loans through which entrepreneurs fund the business
directly or obtain outside financing for the business by pledging personal assets as a guaran-
tee.12 Personal loans are an important source of credit for entrepreneurs in regards to both the
amount of credit and the terms of borrowing. Avery, Bostic & Samolyk (1998) find evidence
that most (55.5%) small business credit is backed by some form of personal guarantee or col-
lateral. Berger & Udell (1995) find that riskier businesses are more likely to pledge personal
collateral, and in doing so are able to obtain lower interest rates. The focus of this paper, home
equity loans, should be considered as personal loans, as the equity in the entrepreneur’s home
is being pledged as collateral. I find the use of personal loans for business financing increased
during the credit crunch.
9See Kerr & Nanda (2009) for a thorough survey.
10The authors study French administrative data and exploit collateral shocks in regional housing markets. They
find that those who experience a positive house-value shock show a higher rate of entry and, upon entry, use more
debt and have larger firms.
11This finding is supported by Moore (2004) who uses home equity at the time of entry as a proxy for wealth.
12Mankart & Rodano (2012) show that almost all entrepreneurial borrowing is secured and that this allows
bankruptcy laws to be more lenient. See Berger & Udell (1998) for a thorough overview of small business
finance.
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All else being equal, an entrepreneur would prefer to use business loans, as personal loans
increase the household’s exposure to business risk, undoing the insurance against such risk
provided by limited liability and personal bankruptcy exemptions.13 The potential increase in
business risk is significant as entrepreneurs hold a substantial fraction of wealth in their busi-
ness: Moskowitz & Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) find that on average, entrepreneurs hold 70% of
their equity in a single business. Furthermore, although entrepreneurs are, to varying degrees,
exposed to undiversified business risk, Vereschagina & Hopenhayn (2009) find no evidence of
a premium for entrepreneurial investment as compensation. In a model of occupational choice
where wealthy households choose to become entrepreneurs, borrowing constraints induce rela-
tively poor entrepreneurs to take on riskier projects, which leave them more susceptible to fai-
lure. That wealthier entrepreneurs fare better is supported by Levine & Rubinstein (2013), who
find that, although median earnings for entrepreneurs are lower than non-entrepreneurs, median
earnings of incorporated entrepreneurs are higher than median earnings of less-wealthy, unin-
corporated entrepreneurs.14 Because the credit crunch limited the supply of small business
credit, entrepreneurs faced the trade-off between obtaining credit through personal loans and
increasing business risk exposure more frequently during this episode. Considering this, the
period studied in this paper (2007-2009) is ideal.
As a home is typically a household’s most valuable asset, there have been many studies
into the effects of house value on small businesses. For instance, Adelino, Schoar & Seve-
rino (2013) exploited geographic variation to show that, between 2002-2007, areas with rising
house prices experienced a higher rate of small business formation and that this was a signifi-
cant source of employment.15 The relationship between house values and the rate of entry into
entrepreneurship during the Great Recession is less clear. Using micro-data, I find that the rate
of entry increased between 2007 and 2009 for both homeowners and non-homeowners. This is
surprising as I find evidence of increased use of home-equity-backed personal financing by en-
trepreneurs, and so one might expect the rate of entry for non-homeowners to decrease as they
have no housing wealth. To this point, the housing wealth of entrants increased: entrants who
were also homeowners had much more home equity in 2009 than in 2007. (Mean: 67%, me-
dian: 53%).16 The increase in the entry rate (for both homeowners and non-homeowners) was
13Glover & Short (2010) show that incorporated entrepreneurs, i.e. those that benefit from limited liability, own
larger, more productive businesses. Akyol & Athreya (2011) study a model of self-employment with bankruptcy
exemptions and find that exemptions affect the rate and timing of entrepreneurship.
14Poschke (2012) studies a different source of entrepreneur heterogeneity, ability (as measured by level of
education) and finds that both low and high ability people become entrepreneurs but not those of intermediate
ability.
15In the UK, Black, de Meza & Jeffreys (1996) also use geographic variation to show increasing house values
lead to increased entrepreneur starts.
16Unfortunately, information on the location of respondents is not available in the SCF. Thus I am unable to
directly address the impact of geographic variation in this paper.
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most likely caused by depressed labour markets, as Fairley (2013) also finds that the entrepre-
neurship rate increased in 2009, more so in areas with high local unemployment. In contrast,
Schott (2013) uses MSA-level macro-data and finds the number of start-ups decreased over the
same period, and that this was caused by lower home equity. Seemingly, the Great Recession
affected the entrepreneurship rate through two opposing channels. First, a credit crunch and
lower house prices changed the conditions for business financing, thereby altering the pool
of entrants. Second, poor labour market options induced more households to enter entrepre-
neurship. The focus of this paper is the personal financing channel, though I will present some
evidence for the second channel as well.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe the data and discuss why my
definition of entrepreneurs is appropriate and then present summary statistics in Section 2.3. In
the following two sections I first investigate incumbent and then new entrepreneurs to shed light
on the net flow of entrepreneurs during the financial crisis. In Section 2.4, I show how home
equity and the use of home equity loans affected incumbent entrepreneurs by documenting
differences in the finances of exiting and surviving entrepreneurs, in particular the change in
the exit rate. In Section 2.5, I do the same for new entrepreneurs in 2009 by comparing them
to new entrepreneurs in 2007. I conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 Data
I begin by describing the dataset used herein and then defining entrepreneurship within the
context of this study. I then offer some basic facts concerning the households defined as entre-
preneurs.
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is a tri-annual survey of households that contains
in-depth data about a household’s finances. The survey is a combination of two sub-samples:
a standard sample and an over-sample of rich households. This feature is important for this
project as the majority of entrepreneurs are wealthy and having additional observations in the
upper-tail of the wealth distribution allows for stronger inferences about entrepreneurs. Anot-
her benefit of the SCF is a large and comprehensive series of questions concerning business
ownership. These questions allow me to distinguish between households that own a business
and those that not only own the business, but also “actively manage” said business. I use the
following questions to define an entrepreneur:17
1. Do you (or your family living here) own or share ownership in any privately-held bu-
sinesses, including farms, professional practices, limited partnerships or other business
17These are questions X/P3103 and X/P3104 in the 2007-2009 SCF.
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investments that are not publicly traded?
2. Do you (or anyone in your family living here) have an active management role in any of
these businesses?
If a household answers “yes” to both questions, I call this household an entrepreneur.
Why is this the appropriate definition of an entrepreneur? I am interested in determining
whether household assets, specifically the home, eased financing constraints for those who run
a business. There are two aspects to such households: business ownership and responsibility
for financing decisions. Ownership and active management jointly convey that the household
fulfills both of these features. Those households who report being self-employed and do not
own a business make no financial investment and so are never constrained in their ability to
finance a business, independent of credit conditions. Business owners who do not actively
manage their business are passive investors and do not partake in the financing decisions of the
firm.
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the vast majority of business owners (“Business Owner”)
also actively manage their business (“Active Business Owner”). However, though the fraction
of households that report being self-employed (“Self-Employed”) is similar to the fraction
that report being active business owners, the intersection of these two groups (“Active and
Self-Employed”) reveals that these definitions are not identical (and that any differences are
consistent across survey years.) Thus, in order to study households that both own and financi-
ally operate a business, an actively-managed business owner is the appropriate definition of an
entrepreneur.
The panel edition of the SCF was commissioned by the Federal Reserve Board in response
to the Great Recession.18 Fortunately, interviewers had access to the 2007 responses concer-
ning actively managed businesses, ensuring accuracy in this regard. The re-interview had an
89% response rate with little variation in the response rate across demographics between 2007
and 2009. As discussed in Kinneckell (2010), the survey weights were adjusted to account for
these changes.
To deal with missing data in the survey, the SCF uses multiple imputation. The dataset has
five entries for each observation, one of which is the true observation and four of which are
replicates. Though the imputation procedure is mean-preserving, the replication adds unwar-
ranted observations. So as not to report standard errors which are too high, I drop the replicates
when comparing moments across sub-samples, as is standard in the literature.19
18This was not the first panel edition attempted with the SCF. The 1986 survey respondents were re-interviewed
in 1989, but issues arose which called the survey weights into question. See Freis, Starr-McCluer & Sunde´n (1998)
for discussion.
19See Kinnickell (2011) for a discussion on weights in the SCF.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of entrepreneurs in the U.S. population, various definitions.
Note: “New Entrepreneur” is 2-or-less-year-old “Active Business Owner”. Source: Survey of
Consumer Finances.
Chapter 2. Entrepreneurs’ Use of Home Equity Loans During the Great Recession 19
The SCF contains detailed information on household incomes, assets and debts. As such, I
am able to separate housing related debt into various components. In this paper I am interested
in the use of home equity in obtaining business financing, and so I treat all second mortgages
and home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) as home equity loans. Thus, this definition is
separate from primary mortgages, but contains all other debt backed by a house. Though there
are differences in the structure of second mortgages and HELOCs (i.e. second mortgages have
a fixed term, interest rate and payment schedule whereas HELOCs have an indefinite term and
variable interest rate) both are subordinate to the primary mortgage.
2.3 Summary Statistics
Figure 2.2 shows how the sample evolves over the crisis. Both mean median age increase by
two years, reflecting the length of the panel. The effects of the crisis are readily apparent.
Total assets fall, for the most part caused by dropping house values which also causes home
equity to fall. Despite the drop in home equity home equity loans and HELOC limits increase.
Interestingly, income shows little change.
For the remainder of this paper, I call a worker any respondent who is not an entrepreneur.
The differences between workers and entrepreneurs becomes apparent in Figure 2.3. First,
note the higher nonfinancial income of entrepreneurs and the sharper drop in mean income
during the recession.20 Second, entrepreneurs are much more asset-rich as is well-documented
in other papers.21 Third, total debt does not change much, a reflection of the constancy of
aggregate total debt reported earlier. Fourth and finally, note that home equity loan balances are
much higher for entrepreneurs and are also disproportionately higher relative to house value.
Furthermore, home equity loans and HELOC limit increase for entrepreneurs despite falling
house value and constant total debt.
2.4 Importance of Home Equity for Financing Existing Bu-
sinesses
Access to home equity loans effects the rate of entrepreneurship in two ways: (1) by provi-
ding funding to incumbent entrepreneurs when business financing is deficient, and so lowering
the probability of exit; and (2) by providing funding for entrants, which will be discussed in
20Nonfinancial income is reported in order to avoid changes in income caused by fluctuations in financial
markets which were a notable feature of this period. It is total income less interest, dividend and capital gains
income.
21For instance, Cagetti & De Nardi (2006).
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Figure 2.2: Means of key variables.
Note: nonfinancial income is total income less interest, dividend and capital gains income.
Supporting data along with standard deviations and medians can be found in the Appendix,
Table A.2. Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Figure 2.3: Means of key variables, Workers and Entrepreneurs.
Note: nonfinancial income is total income less interest, dividend and capital gains income.
Supporting data along with standard deviations and medians can be found in the Appendix,
Table A.3. Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Section 2.5. For incumbent entrepreneurs, I find that those with more access to personal loans
had a higher higher rate of survival: entrepreneurs in 2007 that remained entrepreneurs in 2009
had more home equity and larger HELOC limits than those that had exited entrepreneurship
by 2009. In fact, homeowners were 10 percentage points less likely to exit when compared
to non-homeowners (18% to 28%). These results are supported by a probit regression which
controls for differences in, for instance, business value and income.
The differences between exiting entrepreneurs and survivors can be found in Figure 2.4. In
2007, entrepreneurs that survive and remain entrepreneurs through 2009 had a higher mean
house value (51%), on average had more home equity (62%) and a higher HELOC limit
(134%). Surviving entrepreneurs also had proportionally higher house-related debt. The home
loan-to-value ratio, which is the ratio of all house-related debt (including primary mortgages
and home equity loans) to the value of the house, was 21% higher for surviving entrepreneurs
than it was for exiting entrepreneurs in 2007 (0.63 to 0.52).
Furthermore, the finances of surviving and exiting entrepreneurs changed in different ways
between 2007 and 2009. Though both types of entrepreneurs saw similar drops in house va-
lue (surviving: 12%, exiting: 15%) continuing entrepreneurs increased borrowing against their
home while exiting entrepreneurs borrowed less. Reflecting this, the average home loan-to-
value ratio for surviving entrepreneurs increased by 11%, from 0.63 to 0.70. Part of this in-
crease was caused by a lower house value, but home equity loans also increased substantially,
by 21%. In contrast, exiting entrepreneurs saw a decrease in their home loan-to-value ratio, by
8%, from 0.52 to 0.48. Mean first mortgage and home equity loan balances also decreased for
this group as they exited entrepreneurship. So, entrepreneurs that survived the credit crisis in-
creased borrowing against their home, while exiters decreased borrowing, though both groups
saw a similar drop in their house value.
One might think that differences in the finances of exiters and survivers was caused by dif-
fering homeownership rates and not the amount housing wealth, per se. In fact, this pattern is
repeated when only homeowners are considered. Figure 2.5 shows the relevant results for this
sub-sample. In 2007, house value was 40% higher for survivors and home equity was 50% hig-
her. Also in 2007, home equity loan balances were twice as large for continuing entrepreneurs
relative to exiters. By 2009, mean house value for surviving entrepreneurs decreased proporti-
onally less than the mean house value for exiting entrepreneurs. This caused the difference in
house value to increase but, despite this, mean home equity of survivors decreased relative to
exiters, reflecting the increase in house-related borrowing for surviving entrepreneurs. Again,
home equity loans increased by 21% for survivors but did not change for exiters and the home
loan-to-value ratios are moving in different directions.
Perhaps more exiters are simply retiring and the observed changes and differences in their
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Figure 2.4: Summary statistics, 2007 Entrepreneurs.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Figure 2.5: Summary statistics, 2007 Entrepreneurs who are also homeowners.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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finances are caused by this fact and not by the increased use of personal loans to finance the
business. By considering only those households that are working age I show that this is not the
case. Table 2.1 contain the results for working-age entrepreneurs.22 The pattern of decreasing
home loan-to-value ratio for exiters and increasing loan-to-value ratio for survivors is repeated.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics, 2007 working-age entrepreneurs.
2007 2009
Exit Continue Exit Continue
Non-financial Income 110,098 183,288 89,151 158,824
80,600 83,000 70,000 90,000
Assets 977,279 2,289,085 594,345 1,909,180
465,400 714,900 284,400 623,800
Debts 181,052 239,213 155,602 250,516
140,000 149,200 88,400 159,000
House Value 273,976 426,056 221,611 369,341
200,000 270,000 170,000 250,000
First Mortgage 120,486 151,222 103,421 149,703
90,000 105,000 82,000 107,000
Home Equity Loans 7,923 18,901 10,114 22,302
0 0 0 0
HELOC Limit 17,481 38,026 15,174 40,174
0 0 0 0
Home Equity 145,567 255,933 108,076 197,336
62,000 118,000 44,000 80,000
Homeownership 0.84 0.89 0.79 0.88
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Home Loan-to-value 0.57 0.67 0.55 0.77
0.58 0.49 0.64 0.57
N 109 833 98 781
Note: First row is the mean, second the median.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
Increased borrowing against the value of home for surviving entrepreneurs is indicative
of an increased use of personal loans to finance the business, when paired with the opposite
change for exiters. As further evidence that housing wealth is being used by entrepreneurs for
business financing, I document a more frequent use of home equity loans by survivors and a
less frequent use by exiters. Table 2.2 shows a net decrease in the use of home equity loans
by exiters (4.4%, the difference between “stop” and “start” in the exit row) and a net increase
by survivors (1.2%) whereas non-entrepreneurs show no change. I document the same pattern
22Working age is defined here as under 65.
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in the use of personal collateral or guarantees to fund the business.23 In 2007 16% of eventual
exiters were using such guarantees while 20% of survivors were doing the same. By 2009 the
fraction of continuing entrepreneurs that had used personal guarantees had increased to 24.2%.
These results are found in Table 2.3.




Never Stop Start Always
Worker 83.5 4.0 4.0 8.6
Exit 78.7 7.0 2.6 11.8
Survive 66.4 8.3 9.5 15.8
Total 81.2 4.5 4.6 9.7
Note: Percent by row.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.




Never Stop Start Always
Exit 84.0 16.1 - -
Survive 68.0 7.9 12.0 12.1
Total 74.7 7.7 9.7 7.9
Note: Percent by row.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
The results above show that continuing entrepreneurs had more access to personal loans
than did exiters and that their use of these loans increased during a period of tight business
credit. That exiting entrepreneurs reduced their use of home equity borrowing is telling: it
suggests that continuing entrepreneurs were using these funds for their business.24 However,
to determine the effect of having more equity on survival, one must consider other factors such
23In the SCF respondents are asked “Are you (or your family living here) using personal assets as collateral or
did you have to cosign or guarantee any loans for (this business/these businesses)?”
24Herkenhoff, Phillips & Cohen-Cole (2016) also study the SCF and draw a similar conclusion from observati-
onal evidence. Robb & Robinson (2012) obtain direct evidence from the Kauffman Survey and also conclude that
personal borrowing is used as a source of start-up funding for many entrepreneurs.
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as higher business value or income.25
To control for other possible influences on the survival probability of entrepreneurs, I use
the following probit model to estimate the contribution of housing related debts and assets:
Pr
(
Entrepreneur in 2009|X) = Φ(Xβ)
where
Xβ = Demoβd + Incomeβi + Assetsβa + Debtβb + Homeβh
and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. The sample
for this regression is all entrepreneurs in 2007. The dependent variable is a dummy for en-
trepreneur status in 2009 and the independent variables are all 2007 values. This method was
chosen as the regression results are meant to be interpreted as a forecast of entrepreneurial
status in 2009 as determined by the state of household finances in 2007, specifically housing
related assets and debts. As such, only 2007 data should be available for the forecast. For
different specifications Home is either (1) a homeownership dummy and HELOC limit; (2)
home equity; (3) home equity loan balances and house value; or (4) all of the preceding. These
variables were separated to avoid collinearity issues.26
Table 2.4 shows the results of this regression, which support the hypothesis that homeo-
wnership and home equity loans improved the survival probability of entrepreneurs that had
access to this channel of lending.27 The coefficients for homeownership, home equity and
home equity loan balances are all positive and significantly different from zero. Furthermore,
the coefficient for HELOC Limit, which is the total funds which can be drawn against home
equity through an established line of credit, is also positive and significant. Interestingly, ha-
ving more liquid assets or other assets do not seem to be predictive of survival. This suggests
that entrepreneurs are specifically able to use their home, as opposed to other assets, to obtain
personal loans for the business. Higher business value is also predictive of survival, as more
valuable businesses may more readily weather poor credit conditions and low demand.
The marginal effects of the key variables can be found in Table 2.5. When holding all
other variables at their means, the marginal effect of homeownership decreases the probability
25An alternative story is that “better” entrepreneurs are richer and have more housing wealth, thus the increased
survival probability is due to entrepreneur quality, not higher levels of home equity, per se. The probit model
estimated in this section includes measures that are correlated with business quality to control for this effect.
Another influence on the results that I am unable to control for is the vulnerability of the business, i.e. the security
of the business’ finances.
26A description of each variable can be found in Table A.4.
27“Correctly Classified” measures the accuracy of the regression by classifying observations dependent on
whether the predicted probability is greater or less than half. The percentage of observations that are correctly
classified can increase or decrease for different cutoffs.
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Table 2.5: Marginal effects, probit model to measure effect on entrepreneur status in 2009.
Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own Home 0.0530 (0.00) 0.0497 (0.00)
HELOC Limit 0.0250 (0.00) 0.0023 (0.00)
Home Equity 0.0041 (0.00) 0.0003 (0.00)
Home Equity Loans 0.0042 (0.00) -0.0000 (0.83)
House Value 0.0038 (0.00) -0.0000 (0.20)
Note: p values in parentheses; All other variables fixed at means.
of exit from 21% to 13%. Increasing an entrepreneurs HELOC limit by $10,000 decreases the
probability of exit by 2.5%. An increase of $25,000 in home equity decreases the probability of
exit by 1%. The marginal effect of home equity loan balances deserves some discussion. In the
sense that additional home equity borrowing in 2007 precludes additional borrowing against
home equity one would expect the marginal effect of 2007 home equity loan balances to be
negative. However, if home equity loan borrowing was effective in improving an entrepreneurs
chance of survival or if the quality of the business is positively correlated with both probability
of survival and access to credit (for instance if a bank loan officer is able to discern the quality
of the business) one would expect the marginal effect to be positive.
In sum, access to personal financing through homeownership, specifically in the form of
home equity loans, increased the probability of survival for entrepreneurs in 2007. Homeo-
wners were less likely to exit, a finding which is robust to controlling for various measures
of business quality and other types of assets. As an indication that these loans were used to
finance business expenditures, borrowing against the home increased on both the intensive and
extensive margin for surviving entrepreneurs, decreased for exiters, and did not change for
non-entrepreneurs.
2.5 Importance of Home Equity for Financing Business En-
try
After discussing the effect that access to personal loans has on the survival of entrepreneurs in
Section 2.4, I turn now to new entrepreneurs. Considering the evidence for incumbent entrepre-
neurs using home equity loans to ease financing constraints, one would expect 2009 entrants to
have more available home equity and a higher homeownership rate than 2007 entrants. Indeed,
I find entrants in 2009 had more housing wealth than entrants in 2007 and so had more availa-
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ble collateral to secure financing. Specifically, entrants in 2009 had more valuable houses and
more available home equity than entrants in 2007, both before and during the housing crash.
2009 entrants also had larger HELOC limits and were borrowing less against the value of their
home at the time of entry.
However, the homeownership rate of new entrepreneurs decreases slightly between 2007
and 2009. That home equity was more important to homeowners in 2009 and the homeowners-
hip rate didn’t change indicates that any change in the non-homeowner rate of entry into entre-
preneurship matched that of homeowners, despite tighter credit conditions. Instead, tightened
credit conditions seemingly manifested in less valuable business starts for non-homeowning
entrepreneurs in 2009, compared to 2007.
2.5.1 Identifying New Entrepreneurs
I identify new entrepreneurs in 2009 by determining which 2009 entrepreneurs were not entre-
preneurs in 2007. Thus, an entrepreneur is new if he or she entered entrepreneurship in either
2008 or 2009: a two-year period. The dataset that I employ is a 2-period panel so I am unable
to apply this method to determine which entrepreneurs were new in 2007, as their status be-





















Figure 2.6: Flow of entrepreneurs across periods.
Note: In order to separate the pool of entrepreneurs (E) in 2007 into those that were entrepre-
neurs in 2005 (stay) and those that were “workers” (W) in 2005 (new) additional information
from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances is required.
To remedy this, I supplement the 2007-2009 Survey of Consumer Finances panel with the
full 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances cross-section. This allows me to use questions regar-
ding the entrepreneur’s business that were asked as part of the usual cross-section survey but
not in the 2009 re-interview. Most relevant for this section is the inclusion of a question which
asks the year the business was started, which is asked of the top three businesses by value. To
maintain consistency with the definition of a new entrepreneur in 2009 (using the panel survey),
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I call an entrepreneur new in 2007 if the business was opened in 2006 or 2007. Furthermore,
if the entrepreneur has more than one business I then use the year the first actively-managed
business was started. This constrains the definition to include only those households who en-
tered entrepreneurship in 2006 or 2007, and precludes entrepreneurs that started second or
third businesses in this two-year period. This is necessary as these households were already
entrepreneurs and so would not have been classified as new in 2009. Again, this aspect of the
definition is consistent with that used in 2009 as data on multiple businesses is aggregated in
the panel survey.
2.5.2 Results
If tightened credit constraints induced 2009 entrants to use more housing wealth to secure
financing, or to do so more frequently, than entrants in 2007, one would expect to see more
valuable houses and more home equity amongst entrants in 2009. As can be seen in Table 2.6,
this is indeed the case. Both mean and median house prices are over a fifth higher in 2009
than in 2007. The differences in home equity are also readily apparent: mean home equity of
2009 entrants is 63% higher than in 2007, and the median is 14% higher. This housing wealth
was also more readily accessible for 2009 entrants: 29% of entrants in 2009 had established
HELOCs (one form of home equity loans) whereas only 11% of 2007 entrants had access to
this form of borrowing. In 2007, of those that had established HELOCs, the mean and median
limits were $124,145 and $83,000 for entrants. Despite house prices decreasing, the mean and
median limit for entrants in 2009 increased to $144,765 and $100,000, respectively. Primary
mortgage balances were also lower for 2009 entrants. All told, the ratio of borrowing against
the home to the value of the home is lower for 2009 entrants than it is for 2007 entrants.28 So,
not only did 2009 entrants have more home equity to borrow against, they also had more access
to immediately available credit.
Table 2.7 repeats the above analysis for homeowners only. As one would expect, the pattern
above is repeated though the differences are much larger. New entrepreneurs in 2009 had higher
valued homes (25% higher mean, 6% median) than 2007 entrants despite the housing crash.
Home equity differences are substantial: 2009 entrants had 67% higher mean (53% higher
median) home equity than did 2007 entrants. Reflecting this, mean HELOC limits (inclusive
of those without HELOCs) are over two and a half times greater for 2009 entrants. As well, the
home loan-to-value ratio was higher for 2007 entrants (0.62) than it was in 2009 (0.55), leaving
2009 entrants with more home equity to borrow against. So, housing wealth was seemingly
more important for entry during the credit crisis, especially for homeowners.
28The home loan-to-value ratio is measured as the sum of primary mortgage balances, second mortgage balan-
ces, outstanding home equity loans, and HELOC balances divided by house value.
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Table 2.6: Comparison of new entrepreneurs in 2007 and 2009.
2007 2009
New All New All
Homeownership (2007) 0.77 0.88 0.74 0.86
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Homeownership (2009) - - 0.76 0.86
- - 1.00 1.00
House Value (2007) 234,420 411,962 327,620 416,270
160,000 250,000 220,000 250,000
House Value (2009) - - 287,614 366,934
- - 200,000 240,000
Home Equity (2007) 101,516 256,198 209,586 261,992
44,000 110,000 76,000 110,000
Home Equity (2009) - - 165,800 211,474
- - 50,000 82,000
Home Equity Loans (2007) 13,371 16,834 12,219 17,281
0 0 0 0
Home Equity Loans (2009) - - 14,918 21,351
- - 0 0
HELOC Limit 14,038 34,391 35,247 41,913
0 0 0 0
Primary Mortgage 119,533 138,930 106,897 134,109
110,000 92,000 68,000 88,000
Home Loan-to-value 0.48 0.54 0.42 0.58
0.50 0.38 0.40 0.42
Liquid Assets 38,013 64,900 28,650 74,253
4,200 11,300 5,500 10,000
Other Assets 307,984 900,337 475,576 812,898
53,800 171,000 90,000 152,000
Business Value 214,561 908,665 198,396 654,493
20,000 81,000 10,000 50,000
Non-Financial Income 83,636 172,599 118,357 152,890
61,000 83,000 82,000 90,000
Debt 173,825 221,556 173,140 228,221
147,900 140,000 122,000 133,000
N 69 1,145 133 1,132
Note: first row is the mean, second the median.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Table 2.7: Comparison of new entrepreneurs in 2007 and 2009, homeowners.
2007 2009
New All New All
Homeownership (2007) 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.96
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Homeownership (2009) - - 1.00 1.00
- - 1.00 1.00
House Value (2007) 302,890 467,917 413,337 469,525
230,000 300,000 260,000 300,000
House Value (2009) - - 378,784 424,941
- - 245,000 275,000
Home Equity (2007) 131,167 290,996 269,607 298,738
70,000 139,000 115,000 139,000
Home Equity (2009) - - 218,356 244,905
- - 108,000 115,000
Home Equity Loans (2007) 17,276 19,121 16,025 19,926
0 0 0 0
Home Equity Loans (2009) - - 19,647 24,726
- - 0 0
HELOC Limit 18,139 39,063 46,420 48,539
0 0 0 0
Primary Mortgage 154,447 157,801 140,781 155,310
149,000 109,000 120,000 112,000
Home Loan-to-value 0.62 0.62 0.55 0.67
0.71 0.45 0.57 0.52
Liquid Assets 47,194 71,260 36,026 83,589
4,200 12,000 9,400 12,000
Other Assets 371,255 993,561 597,337 918,434
88,000 204,500 185,000 194,000
Business Value 197,044 967,829 256,251 718,684
17,000 89,000 17,000 50,000
Non-Financial Income 92,795 185,053 133,036 164,603
73,000 89,000 100,000 95,400
Debt 215,568 244,784 223,127 260,451
184,000 161,000 180,000 172,000
N 58 1,075 110 1,058
Note: first row is the mean, second the median.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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As a demonstration of the uniqueness of housing wealth vis-a`-vis entrepreneurial financing,
Table 2.8 shows the differences in new non-homeowners in 2007 and 2009. Here sample size
becomes an issue, but some conclusions can be drawn. First, both liquid assets and other assets
(total assets less liquid assets and business value) of entrants in 2007 and 2009 were very
similar.29 That I find no difference between the asset levels of these two groups, as well as the
lower amount of assets available to them when compared to other entrepreneurs, suggests that
no more collateral was required of non-homeowner entrepreneurs during the credit crisis and
that little is required during “normal” conditions. That is not to say that the credit crisis had no
effect. There was a large difference in the value of a new entrepreneur’s business in 2007 and
2009: the mean value in 2007 is over 17 times higher than in 2009, and the median value is
over 20 times higher. So, tightened credit standards did not result in any changes in the asset
levels of (non-homeowning) entrants, but instead resulted in much smaller business starts.
Table 2.8: Comparison of new entrepreneurs in 2007 and 2009, non-homeowners.
2007 2009
New All New All
Liquid Assets 6,583 18,078 5,384 15,196
3,600 3,600 1,600 3,000
Other Assets 91,366 213,984 91,455 145,321
38,000 38,000 9,100 18,000
Business Value 274,534 473,074 15,878 248,445
106,000 50,000 5,000 20,000
Personal Collateral 28,221 18,072 0 60,135
0 0 0 0
Non-Financial Income 52,280 80,912 72,047 78,801
45,000 50,000 54,000 60,000
Debt 30,911 50,544 15,443 24,344
24,300 20,200 2,700 11,000
N 11 70 23 74
Note: first row is the mean, second the median.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
Though the effects of tightened credit conditions appear in the housing wealth available to
entrants with a home, the rate of homeownership amongst entrants did not increase between
2007 and 2009, and in fact dropped from 77% to 76%.30 This is surprising as new entrepre-
29These results are statistically significant using unranked and ranked median tests and a t-test of the means.
30The decrease in homeownership is probably understated in the SCF panel as survey respondents acquire
homes between 2007 and 2009 and so the 2009 homeownership rate is upwardly biased. The unconditional
upward bias in the 2009 homeownership rate is roughly 2%.
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neurs in 2009 had more housing wealth than those in 2007, suggesting that tightened credit
conditions necessitated the increased use of personal wealth to finance the business, and so one
might expect more homeownership in 2009. Table 2.9 shows a proportional increase in the
homeowner and non-homeowner rate of entry, leaving the homeownership rate roughly con-
stant. Though it may be surprising that the rate of entrepreneurship increased (especially for
non-homeowners who started much smaller businesses in 2009 when compared to 2007), Fair-
ley (2013) finds that higher local unemployment rates increase the probability that a household
starts a business.
Table 2.9: Fraction of entrepreneurs in the U.S. population, by homeownership.
2007 (CS) 2007 (PNL) 2009 (PNL)
HO RT All HO RT All HO RT All
New Entrepreneurs 1.56 0.31 1.88 1.25 0.36 1.61 2.21 0.70 2.91
Incumbent 9.39 1.23 10.62 9.95 1.16 11.11 9.15 1.09 10.25
All Entrepreneurs 10.95 1.54 12.49 11.20 1.52 12.72 11.36 1.80 13.16
Notes: (1) Fraction of total population is reported; (2) New entrepreneurs are those that started within 2
years of survey year, Incumbents are entrepreneurs who aren’t new; (3) HO - homeowner, RT -
non-homeowner; (4) CS - cross-section survey, PNL - panel survey. Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
The above results show that using personal loans to fund a business is important for new
entrepreneurs and that differences may exist in the financing options available to homeowners
and non-homeowners. These differences may be caused by the tendency of non-homeowners
to start smaller business, and not solely homeownership. Table 2.10 offers a comparison of
small and large new entrepreneur starts in 2007 and 2009.31
In regards to small businesses (one or fewer employees), more housing wealth was available
to 2009 entrants. New entrepreneurs in 2009 had 28% more home equity on average (54%
median) and 5% higher house values on average (23% median). HELOC limits were over
6 times greater for small 2009 entrants, when compared to small 2007 entrants (including
households without HELOCs). Mirroring the broader picture, the home loan-to-value ratio
was lower for 2009 small entrants (0.35 mean, 0.22 median) than it was 2007 small entrants
(0.45 mean, 0.59 median). Small entrants in 2009 had more housing wealth than those in 2007,
and so had more available collateral that could be used to obtain financing.
Entrepreneurs who start large businesses also seemed to be more housing rich in 2009,
though the picture is less clear. Mean house values and home equity are 48% and 221% higher,
respectively (median house values are 149% higher in 2009.) However, counter to the previ-
31The SCF asks “(In total how/How) many people work for (these businesses/this business), including you (or
anyone in your family living here)?” I use this measure as a proxy for business size.
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Table 2.10: Comparison of new entrepreneurs in 2007 and 2009, by size.
Small Large
2007 2009 2007 2009
Homeownership 0.74 0.73 0.82 0.79
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
House Value 238,034 250,274 230,210 339,987
155,000 190,000 160,000 238,000
Home Equity 113,205 145,327 87,901 194,514
54,000 83,000 40,000 25,000
Home Equity Loans 9,528 16,843 17,847 12,218
0 0 0 0
HELOC Limit 7,760 49,173 21,351 15,715
0 0 0 0
Primary Mortgage 115,301 88,104 124,462 133,256
104,000 39,000 117,000 112,000
Home Loan-to-value 0.45 0.35 0.52 0.51
0.59 0.22 0.49 0.57
Liquid Assets 44,677 14,873 30,252 47,974
4,200 4,000 4,600 7,600
Other Assets 202,306 327,597 431,075 683,127
43,200 80,000 122,050 150,500
Business Value 122,105 91,768 322,251 347,949
15,000 0 50,000 40,000
Number of Employees 0.76 0.50 16.34 45.95
1.00 0.00 3.00 3.00
Non-Financial Income 79,892 101,062 87,998 142,613
50,000 75,000 61,000 91,000
Debt 166,599 150,379 182,241 205,063
115,700 71,000 171,000 184,060
N 32 64 37 69
Notes: (1) small is one or fewer employees; (2) first row is the mean, second
the median. Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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ously discussed results, median home equity is 38% for lower 2009 large entrants and HELOC
limits are also lower (27% mean, 26% median). Here liquid and other assets may have played
a larger role: new large entrants had more liquid assets and non-housing, non-business assets
in 2009 than in 2007.
In sum, entrants in 2007 had less housing wealth to borrow against than those in 2009
suggesting the credit crisis induced nascent entrepreneurs to use their housing wealth to finance
their new business. This result is especially apparent for homeowners and relatively small
businesses. For non-homeowners, available wealth for 2007 entrants was very similar to that
of 2009 entrants. In this case, the credit crisis may have manifested itself through much smaller
business values in 2009.
Though the effect of the credit crunch regarding the housing wealth of new entrepreneurs
is, for the most part, clear, in light of the potential effects of business size for example, it would
be informative to determine the effect of higher housing wealth controlling for such effects. To
this end I estimate a probit model.




New Entrepreneur|X) = Φ (Xβ)
where X is a vector of independent variables and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a
standard normal distribution. In this model, X includes, among other variables: demographics
variables such as age, education and race, a dummy variable for homeownership, home equity,
liquid assets in quintiles, other assets (apart from house value, business value and liquid assets),
total income, credit card balance, housing payments, and the debt service ratio, which is a
measure of monthly debt payments to monthly income.
Also included are ratio variables that capture differences in the composition of income and
debt payments of a household. For instance, a new entrepreneur’s wage income may be a lar-
ger portion of their total income as they are more likely to have worked in the previous year.32
These ratio variables include, as a fraction of non-financial income,33 wage income, retirement
income and other income, and as a fraction of total debt payments, housing payments (inclu-
ding mortgage, rent and property tax) and consumer debt payments (credit card and line of
credit payments).
The regression results are reported in Table 2.11 and a description of the variables is in
Table A.4. In 2009, though not in 2007, being in a higher quintile by home equity positively
predicts new entrepreneurship, relative to all entrepreneurs. This suggests that new entrepre-
neurs needed more available housing wealth to pledge and borrow against in order to finance a
32The SCF separates business and self-employment income from wage income.
33Non-financial income is defined as total income less interest, capital gains, and dividend income.
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Table 2.11: Estimated coefficients, probit regression to determine new entrepreneurs.
2007 2009 2007 2009
Age 0.0832∗∗∗ -0.000946∗∗ Income -0.000686∗∗∗ 0.00217∗∗∗
(191.28) (-2.81) (-34.32) (112.30)
Age Squared -0.000706∗∗∗ -0.0000594∗∗∗ Income Squared 6.54e-08∗∗∗ -7.47e-07∗∗∗
(-153.20) (-17.58) (47.42) (-85.65)
Education Liquid Assets
High School 0.0230∗∗∗ -0.0300∗∗∗ 2nd Quintile -0.228∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(6.88) (-12.59) (-127.36) (147.84)
Some College 0.110∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ 3rd Quintile -0.859∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(31.62) (-49.22) (-378.21) (103.23)
College 0.401∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ 4th Quintile -1.243∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(126.35) (-67.76) (-498.57) (204.19)
Race (White) -0.250∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 5th Quintile -0.576∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗
(-168.01) (77.54) (-228.00) (9.92)
Household Size 0.114∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ Other Assets 0.0000511∗∗∗ 0.0000146∗∗∗
(200.79) (304.64) (11.63) (10.23)
Married 0.195∗∗∗ -0.461∗∗∗ Have Retirement -0.00144∗∗∗ 0.00639∗∗∗
(90.91) (-335.36) Assets∗Age (-39.13) (231.19)
Risk Aversion Wage Income 1.122∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
Little Risk -0.0785∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ (563.30) (239.98)
(-29.23) (41.22) Retirement Income -0.115∗∗∗ 1.378∗∗∗
Average Risk 0.449∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ (-28.26) (462.15)
(177.42) (-43.38) Other Income 3.388∗∗∗ 2.303∗∗∗
Substantial Risk 0.423∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ (555.91) (462.37)
(149.95) (53.90) Credit Card Balance -0.0337∗∗∗ 0.0779∗∗∗
Years at Address -0.0570∗∗∗ -0.00532∗∗∗ (-53.83) (215.69)
(-539.46) (-74.17) Debt Payments -0.0956∗∗∗ -0.0261∗∗∗
Years at Job -0.0644∗∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗ (-28.83) (-13.85)
(-729.31) (-426.08) Housing Payments -0.372∗∗∗ 1.616∗∗∗
Own Home -0.0444∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ (-56.26) (274.93)
(-16.62) (-98.14) Consumer Debt Pay. -0.255∗∗∗ 1.299∗∗∗
Home Loan to Value -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ (-36.12) (204.47)
(-17.18) (-71.80) Debt Service Ratio 0.554∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗
Home Equity (370.92) (-223.07)
2nd Quintile 0.362∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ Log Business Value -0.162∗∗∗ -0.0832∗∗∗
(159.72) (219.92) (-374.67) (-259.66)
3rd Quintile -0.408∗∗∗ 0.0588∗∗∗ Employees 0.0000809∗∗∗ 0.000135∗∗∗
(-153.58) (19.80) (31.64) (91.29)
4th Quintile -0.867∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ Personal Collateral -0.00295∗∗∗ 0.0000426∗∗∗
(-294.65) (116.07) (-55.52) (29.28)
5th Quintile -1.063∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ Service Industry 0.368∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗
(-309.91) (96.49) (273.38) (535.07)
Net Worth (percentile) 0.0302∗∗∗ -0.00998∗∗∗ Constant -3.487∗∗∗ -1.299∗∗∗
(522.30) (-275.02) (-288.68) (-113.02)
Observations 1,145 1,132 Correctly Classified 90.81% 84.75%
Observations (weighted) 12,641,588 11,997,571 Pseudo R2 0.3648 0.2291
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Variables in units of $10,000 where appropriate. See Table A.4 for description of variables.
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new business in 2009. New entrepreneurs are also more likely to have used personal collateral
to obtain funding for their business in 2009, though less likely in 2007. However, in both 2007
and 2009 new entrepreneurs are less likely to own a home, relative to all entrepreneurs. Entre-
preneurs that have more liquid assets are less likely to be new entrepreneurs in 2007 and more
likely to be new in 2009, a reflection of increased credit standards which in 2009 required a
new entrepreneur to provide more personal collateral in all forms. The marginal effects of the
key variables can be found in Table 2.12.
Table 2.12: Marginal effects, probit regression to determine new entrepreneurs.
2007 2009
Variable dy/dx p dy/dx p
Own Home -.00684 (0.00) -.08821 (0.00)
Home Equity
2nd Quintile .06705 (0.00) .12821 (0.00)
3rd Quintile -.05996 (0.00) .01036 (0.00)
4th Quintile -.10745 (0.00) .07266 (0.00)
5th Quintile -.12195 (0.00) .06629 (0.00)
Liquid Assets
2nd Quintile -.03876 (0.00) .05175 (0.00)
3rd Quintile -.12083 (0.00) .03661 (0.00)
4th Quintile -.15352 (0.00) .08323 (0.00)
5th Quintile -.08865 (0.00) .00431 (0.00)
Personal Collateral -.00040 (0.00) .00001 (0.00)
Log Business Value -.02186 (0.00) -.01768 (0.00)
Note: All other variables fixed at means.
There are significant demographic differences in the pool of new entrepreneurs in 2007 and
those in 2009. For instance, new entrepreneurs tend to be older relative to all entrepreneurs in
2007, but younger in 2009. This is also true of education level: new entrepreneurs are more
likely to be college graduates in 2007, but less likely in 2009. Consistent between 2007 and
2009, new entrepreneurs are more likely to have higher wage income relative to total income.
New entrepreneurs also tend to own less valuable businesses. Significant changes between
2007 and 2009 include, relative to all entrepreneurs, in 2009 entrants now have more retirement
income (relative to total income), have higher credit card balances, have more housing and
consumer debt (relative to total debt), but have lower debt service ratios.
These results support the previous findings: that housing wealth was an important source of
personal collateral for entrepreneurs in 2009. Specifically, new entrepreneurs in 2009 had more
available home equity to borrow against than new entrepreneurs in 2007. In fact, home equity
became so important that new entrepreneurs in 2009 had more home equity than incumbent
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entrepreneurs whereas during the ‘looser’ credit conditions of 2007 they had less. For entrants
without homes, tightened credit standards and a lack of housing wealth resulted in less valuable
businesses. These results are robust to controlling for the effects of business value and business
size.
2.6 Conclusion
I make the striking observation that, despite house prices decreasing during the Great Reces-
sion, home equity loan balances increased, all while total debt did not change. The primary
source of the increased use of home equity borrowing was entrepreneurs. I interpret this as
evidence of binding financing constraints for entrepreneurs.
As entrepreneurs were not able to borrow during the credit crunch due to more stringent
loan standards and less bank lending to small businesses, home equity loans allowed entrepre-
neurs to survive the crisis. Personal loans were a substitute for business loans. This confirms
studies such as Quadrini (2000) that find that wealth is important for the entrepreneurship de-
cision but deepens the understanding of how, exactly, wealth is used by entrepreneurs. In this
case, housing wealth is used to ease credit constraints and to aid survival and entry. Of entre-
preneurs in 2007, surviving entrepreneurs had higher rates of homeownership and higher house
values relative to those that did not survive. Furthermore, continuing entrepreneurs increased
borrowing against their home, while exiting entrepreneurs did not. Entrants in 2009 had more
available housing wealth than those in 2007.
As discussed above, the drop in home equity resulted in 2007 entrepreneurs hiring fewer
employees and an increased exit rate, which in turn resulted in job loss as well. Using the
population weights provided with the SCF, changes in home equity, and the results obtained
above we can derive a rough estimate of the change to employment. On average, the drop
in home equity caused a drop of 0.23 employees per business for surviving entrepreneurs,
roughly 5% of the observed drop per business (4.3). Furthermore, the drop in home equity
caused roughly 28,000 entrepreneurs to exit, bringing with them 340,000 employees.
King & Levine (1993) show that effective financial systems that support entrepreneurship
can have a significant impact on economic growth. This paper studies one channel that en-
trepreneurs might employ to finance their business when the usual financial channels are not
available to them. Though entrepreneurs were able to use home equity loans to survive the
Great Recession, it was not costless as more household wealth was exposed to business risk at
the height of the recession. Considering the influence entrepreneurs have on growth and em-
ployment (see, for example, Adelino, Schoar, & Severino, 2012) policies that ease borrowing
constraints for entrepreneurs, such as the 7a loan program from the Small Business Adminis-
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tration, are a potentially beneficial means to improve aggregate conditions.
Chapter 3
The Role of Public Information and Credit
Ratings in the Corporate Bond Market
3.1 Introduction
Firms with AAA credit ratings are disappearing. While in 1985 there were 34 firms with a
AAA rating, by 2011 there were only 4.1 The decline in top rated debt has also taken place at
the AA level; between 1985 and 2010 the number of firms issuing AAA or AA debt dropped
by 70%, while the number of firms issuing A or BBB debt increased by 77% and those issuing
speculative grade debt increased by 129%. Overall the number of firms with a bond rating
increased by 59% (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2.)
Why is the ratings distribution shifting towards more mediocre ratings? The answer to this
question is important as bonds are now a larger share of corporate liabilities. In the Federal
Reserve Board Flow of Funds Data, the share of total liabilities held in bonds grew by 26.5%
between 1985 and 2010. Corporations are increasingly choosing bond and equity financing
over other securities and bank financing.2 Furthermore, the size the corporate bond market
is massive; nonfinancial corporations had $4,691 billion of outstanding bond debt in 2010.3
Considering the size and growth of this market, the underlying cause of the ratings shift may
have a substantial effect on capital markets.
Credit ratings are ostensibly used by investors to determine how likely a firm is to default
on its outstanding debt. Firms with AAA credit ratings are less likely to default than those
rated AA, A, and so forth. On top of this, credit ratings are also a signal of the firm’s general
1The four firms, as rated by Standard & Poor’s, are Johnson & Johnson, Automatic Data Processing Inc.,
Microsoft Corp. and Exxon Mobil Corp.
2The change in share of total corporate liabilities was 20.7%, -76.7%, and -67.1% for equity, securities and
bank financing, respectively.
3$7,167 billion outstanding at the end of 2016, per the most recent data available.
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Figure 3.1: Frequency of ratings by group: AAA or AA, A or BBB, and all speculative grade.
competence, as it is very difficult to achieve the highest ratings. As these ratings are useful to
investors, firms will consult with ratings agencies prior to selling their debt.4
In part, the need for credit ratings is regulatory: many large, institutional investors are
required to hold only investment grade bonds (BBB or higher). Additionally, it is difficult for
firms to credibly relay this information directly to investors, and the auditing process would be
very onerous for an individual investor. Thus the credit rating agencies are able to exploit some
efficiencies of scale. There is a trade-off for firms however: they must devote resources to non-
productive ratings activities in order to satisfy the requirements of the credit rating agencies,
on top of the fee for the rating service itself.5 For instance, a firm is required to hold cash on
hand to satisfy the requirements for a particular rating. If credit ratings were not required to
sell corporate bonds, firms might be able to reallocate their resources to increase profits.
Considering the value of a credit rating, a natural question arises: why are the highly rated
firms disappearing? I argue that firms are no longer willing to pay the cost to achieve high
ratings. To this point:
4Though it is possible to issue debt without consulting with a credit ratings agency, almost all firms do.
Nevertheless, both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s will issue a rating regardless of the firm’s participation.
5This is typically a percentage of the size of the bond issue.
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Figure 3.2: Share of ratings by group: AAA or AA, A or BBB, and all speculative grade.
“Scores of big companies have lost their AAA status in recent years as it became
seen in board rooms as more of a straitjacket than a path to riches.”
(Eric Dash, New York Times, August 2, 2011)
To capture this change, I propose the following mechanism. As credit ratings have value as
a signal of firm “quality” in the sense that they provide investors with information about the
future performance of the firm, they are an alternative to other publicly available channels of
firm information. These channels include SEC 10K filings, which contain pertinent financial
data from public firms and are now provided electronically, as well as media such as the Wall
Street Journal Online and Bloomberg. With the proliferation of this information, investors
now have direct access to firm information which may convince them to purchase lower-rated
bonds. Firms no longer need to rely solely on a credit rating as a signal of their type, as the
demand for their bonds is now also dependent on this costless, public channel.
The topic was originally discussed in the financial press, from whom multiple answers have
emerged. Besides firms’ unwillingness to pay for improved ratings, other suggestions include
investors simply having a larger appetite for risk so they are more willing to purchase lower
rated bonds, and investors no longer placing much stock in corporate bond ratings. Though
Chapter 3. The Role of Public Information and Credit Ratings in the Corporate Bond Market 45
seemingly disparate, I argue that these three answers are essentially the same. Firms will lower
their rating and reduce the associated costs if they are able to sell their debt at a lower rating.
This would be possible if the demand for lower investment grade bonds has increased relative
to high investment grade bonds. In effect, there is lower demand for top ratings from both
investors and firms.
To formalize this story, I construct a model that contains a “peacock” problem: the firm
must divert resources to non-productive rating activities in order to improve its expected credit
rating. Firms are endowed with a project and differ only in the probability that this project will
pay off with the higher return. Both the credit rating and a costless public signal are correlated
with the firm’s type. This type is unknown to everyone, including the firm. As the firm learns
something about its type from the public signal, this will influence the decision to invest in the
rating process. Once this decision is made, a credit rating is formed for all firms. Knowing the
public signal and the credit rating, investors then decide whether to invest in the firm’s project.
To capture the proliferation of information over the period in question, I increase the correlation
of the public signal with a firm’s type (the “accuracy” of the signal). Under general conditions,
the resulting change in the distribution of credit ratings matches the change observed in the
data.
The mechanism works as follows. Investors are unable to observe an individual firm’s
type but have access to credit ratings and the public signal. Firms with projects that have a
higher expected payoff will be more likely to receive a high public signal and more likely to
earn a high rating. The investors are then able to offer lower interest rates to those firms with
higher ratings and signals. Additionally, a higher rating will increase the probability that a firm
receives an investment. As the accuracy of the signal increases, firms and investors learn more
about the type of the firm, which may induce firms to forego investing to achieve a high rating.
In equilibrium, an increase in the accuracy of the public signal will result in fewer firms with
high ratings and more firms with mediocre and low ratings.
The primary testable implication of the model is the increase in the dispersion of interest
rates within a rating class. When the accuracy of the public signal is low, the interest rates given
to two firms with the same rating and different signals will be closer than when the accuracy is
high. In effect, the difference between interest rates increases with the accuracy of the signal
as investors are more sure that these firms have different underlying types. Using data from the
Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database, I show that this pattern is borne out between 1990
and 2010.
There are alternative explanations that need to be explored. One must consider that firms
may be, in fact, more likely to default. That is, there exist fewer firms in 2010 with the same
expected default rate as the AAA-rated firms in 1985. It is very difficult to measure a change
Chapter 3. The Role of Public Information and Credit Ratings in the Corporate Bond Market 46
in default probabilities as the default rate for AAA and AA-rated firms is very close to zero.
A proxy for default probability is the leverage ratio, which is a measure of the indebtedness
of firm relative to some form of its value, either assets or equity. It follows that a firm with
a higher debt burden to value ratio will be more likely to default than one with either lower
debt or higher firm value, as the latter will find it easier to service its debt. I calculate and plot
the average leverage ratios for different cohorts of AAA and AA-rated firms over the relevant
period in Figure 3.3. The leverage ratios are roughly stable for each cohort. This indicates that
higher-levered firms do not seem to be driving the change in the ratings distribution.
It may be the case that the distribution of bond ratings has changed for reasons not related
to firm behaviour. For instance, credit rating agencies may have changed the standards used to
determine a firm’s rating (or may be applying them differently), while the relevant measures of
firm behaviour have remained constant. If this was the case, the within-rating average leverage
ratios would either increase or decrease depending on whether that rating class has become
relatively more or less prone to default. By computing the average leverage ratio within a
rating by year, I show that this is not the case. Average leverage ratios have changed very little
over the relevant period. The results can be seen in Figure 3.4.
Another possibility is that top rated firms are merging. To examine this I do two things.
First, I show that the assets controlled by all AAA firms as a fraction of GDP is decreasing.6
Second, as there are very few firms with AAA ratings, I can follow the cohort of AAA firms in
1985 to determine the evolution of their debt, including whether the debt rating changed, the
debt was retired, or the firm merged with another. As can be seen in Table 3.1, though some
firms do merge when viewed over the entire horizon, for the most part the firms end up at a
lower rating.
In all markets, the rating system is designed to measure relative credit risk. The credit
rating agencies (CRAs) assert that a rating does not measure absolute default probability and
that a rating does not constitute investment advice. The purpose of this position is to ensure
protection from liability claims and to continue their status as a Nationally Recognized Statis-
tical Rating Organization (NRSRO). This designation is important as only ratings from such
an organization may be used to satisfy legal obligations as to which debt may be held by large,
institutional investors. An example of such an investor is a pension fund which is required to
hold only investment grade debt.7 Another example is any bank that has committed itself to
the Basel Accords, which specify a capital requirement based on the rating composition of the
bank’s assets.
6If AAA firms were merging, it may be the case that the sum of assets controlled by AAA-rated firms stayed
roughly constant.
7Debt is considered investment grade if it has a rating of BBB or above. Debt rated BB or lower is deemed
speculative grade or high yield.
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Apart from the large U.S. banks, CRAs such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch have
suffered the most criticism in the wake of the recent financial crisis and the Great Recession.
This criticism is perhaps justified in regards to how the CRAs rated structured finance products,
such as mortgage-backed securities and the credit default swaps based on these securities, but
it is important to consider the different markets for ratings separately.8 This is because the
structure of the markets differs greatly, and thus the behaviour of CRAs will be different in
each.
Though most academic work has focused on the CRA behaviour in the structured finance
markets, Manso (2011) considers CRA behaviour in the market for corporate bonds. Where
this paper studies an environment with a “passive” CRA, Manso (2011) shows the importance
of feedback effects of rating changes when the CRA is able to choose the standards for a rating.
The feedback effect begins with a rating adjustment, which in turn affects the interest rate the
firm is charged by the markets, as the perceived default risk has changed. As the interest rate
changes, the default probability will also change as the debt burden will increase or decrease
with the change in interest rate. Thus a CRA which is more “lax” may be preferred to one
with more stringent rating criteria. Another branch of the literature that concerns this work is
credit rationing in the market for firm debt, which was introduced by Stiglitz & Weiss (1981).
The authors show that, under certain conditions, bank credit may be rationed between firms in
markets with incomplete information. Bester (1985) extends the model to show that collateral
may be used to screen firms and that in this environment at most one submarket will see credit
rationing.
Skreta & Veldkamp (2009) show that, as the complexity of the asset increases, the oppor-
tunity to “shop for ratings” also increases, as it is more difficult to judge the default probability
of the asset.9 This will then cause inflation in ratings. In a related paper, Bolton, Freixas &
Shapiro (2009) show that competition can also cause ratings inflation when investors cannot
observe when a rating is produced but not published. Another feature of markets that may
pervert CRA incentives is the concentration of issuers. He, Qian & Strahan (2011) found that
CRAs favoured large issuers during the recent financial crisis by giving their products higher
ratings. This is because the primary source of CRA revenues is payments from issuers (referred
to as an “issuer pays” model). In this paper I focus only on the market for corporate bonds,
which is not impacted by the above effects, as the market is not dominated by a small number
of issuers and corporate bonds are not complex assets.
8For articles concerned with these securities see, for instance, Bolton, Freixas & Shapiro (2009) and He, Qian
& Strahan (2011) which are discussed later in this paper.
9More specifically, when firms solicit multiple rating agencies the resulting difference in ratings will be larger
across agencies if the rating produced is noisier. The rating will be noisier if the asset is more complex. Firms
then choose the highest rating, and the resulting ratings distribution is “inflated.”
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides further detail about the change in the
ratings distribution. The model is introduced and relevant results are shown in Sections 3.3 and
3.4. Section 3.5 shows the change in bond price dispersion. Section 3.6 discusses the empirical
and analytical results. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Distribution of Ratings
The firm data used in this project are from COMPUSTAT, including the ratings subset. This
data covers all firms that file quarterly reports with the SEC. The ratings subset includes any
firm which receives a rating from S&P. I further restrict the sample to include only non-financial
firms and firms not primarily owned by the federal government, as the process involved in
raising capital may vastly differ with that for non-financial firms. The sample includes 51,610
firm-year observations and 5,319 unique firms.
The most natural reason for the number of AAA ratings to drop is that there are fewer firms
with a default probability that is deserving of a AAA rating. That is, there exist fewer firms
in 2010 with the same expected default rate as the AAA-rated firms in 1985, assuming the
required default rate for a AAA rating is the same. It is very difficult to measure a change in
default probabilities as the default rate for AAA and AA-rated firms is very close to zero. So,
there may be no difference in the ex post default rate despite a different expected default rate
ex ante.
A useful proxy for default probability is the leverage ratio, which is a measure of the in-
debtedness of a firm relative to some form of its value, either assets or equity. It follows that a
firm with a higher debt to value ratio will be more likely to default than one with either lower
debt or higher firm value as the latter will find it easier to retire its debt. I calculate and plot
the average leverage ratios for different cohorts of AAA and AA-rated firms over the relevant
period in Figure 3.3. The leverage ratios are calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets from individual components reported in COMPUSTAT, at an annual frequency.10 The
leverage ratios are roughly stable for each cohort. This indicates that more highly levered firms
do not seem to be driving the change in the ratings distribution.
It may be the case that the distribution of bond ratings has changed for reasons not related
to firm behaviour. Primarily, CRAs may have changed the standards used to determine a firm’s
rating, while the relevant measures of firm behaviour have remained constant. If this was the
case the within rating average leverage ratios would either increase or decrease depending on
whether that rating class has become relatively more or less prone to default. By computing the
10Illiev & Welch (2010) note that two correct alternatives exist, the liabilities to assets ratio and the debt to
capital ratio. I compute both and find the same pattern in each.
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Figure 3.3: Within-cohort average leverage ratios, non-financial corporations. A cohort is as
all firms in the sample that were rated AAA or AA in the given year.
average leverage ratio within a rating by year, I show that this is not the case. Average leverage
ratios have changed very little over the relevant period. The results can be seen in Figure 3.4.
Another possibility is that highly rated firms are merging. This would imply a decrease
in the number of highly rated firms, without a significant drop in the total assets controlled
by these firms. By aggregating the assets over ratings and normalizing the levels by dividing
by GDP, I show that the share of assets controlled by AAA and AA-rated firms has dropped
significantly. The decrease in assets held by AAA and AA-rated firms is commensurate with
the decrease in the number of AAA and AA-rated firms. Also, there is an increase in the
assets controlled by firms rated A, BBB, or lower, again matching the change in the rating
distribution. These series can be seen in Figure 3.5.
To further validate this claim, in Table 3.1 I follow the 1985 cohort of AAA-rated firms.
Though 6 of the 34 firms with a AAA rating did eventually exit the sample through merger, a
majority of the firms arrived at the end of the sample with a lower credit rating. In fact, all but
one of the firms that merged over this period were involved in the conglomeration of regional
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Figure 3.4: Within rating average leverage ratios, non-financial corporations.
telecommunications companies into the national entities in operation today.
A final concern that I have addressed is that, although the distribution of ratings may be
changing due to some previously unexplored effect, ratings are now insignificant as bonds
make a smaller portion of firm financing. This does not seem to be the case, however. Using
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Flow of Funds dataset, I calculate that the share of
corporate bonds to total liabilities has increased by 26% from 1985 to 2010 for all non-farm,
non-financial corporations. Of the other broad classes of financing, equity grew by 20.7%,
while other securities and bank financing decreased by 76.7% and 67.1%, respectively.
3.3 Model
The aim of the model is to capture the change in the way investors obtain information relevant
to their purchase of corporate bonds. Obtaining relevant information directly from the firm
is costly for an individual investor, if it is possible at all, whereas rating agencies distribute a
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Figure 3.5: Assets controlled by each rating class, non-financial corporations, as a fraction of
GDP.
summary of this information in the form of a credit rating. In order to attain a higher rating,
firms must devote resources to non-productive ratings activities, such as increasing their cash
at hand. As the access to financial information has increased for investors, through channels
such as electronic distribution of SEC 10K filings and other sources discussed above, there is
now a direct channel between firms and investors. I model this channel as a noisy public signal
that is correlated with the probability that a firm’s project will result in the higher return, which
I call the firm’s type.
This section continues with an outline of the environment which describes the players,
timing, and information flows. More detail is then provided about the role of public signals
and credit ratings. The firm and investor problems follow. The equilibrium concept is then
defined, along with the solution to the firm’s problem and the investor’s decision rule.
3.3.1 Environment
Firms are endowed with a project which will have either a low or high return. The probability of
the high return is referred to as the firm’s type, θ{g, b}, is unknown to all. First, a public signal,
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Table 3.1: Evolution of circa 1985 AAA firms
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
AAA 34 26 17 8 4 1
AA 0 4 8 3 6 8
A 0 1 3 9 6 7
BBB 0 0 1 2 3 3
B 0 1 1 0 0 0
Merged 0 1 2 6 6 6
Retired 0 1 2 6 9 9
ν{h, l}, which is correlated with the firm’s type is observed by all. The firm then chooses the
amount of resources it devotes to non-productive rating activities, i[0, 1], knowing the public
signal but not their type. Let c(i) be the cost investing i. This investment will increase the
probability that the firm receives a high credit rating and lower the probability is receives a low
credit rating.
A credit rating, κ{A, B,C}, which is also correlated with the firm’s type, is then produced
by a passive and exogenous credit rating agency and observed by all. The distribution of credit
ratings depends on the distribution of θ and i as a firm’s rating is influenced by both its type
and investment in the ratings process. After observing ν and κ, investors decide whether to
purchase the firm’s debt at the market interest rate, R(κ, ν). The outcome of the project is then
realized and debts are paid.
To make the investment decision non-trivial I assume that probability of the higher return
is such that the expected return to low-type projects is lower than the borrowing cost required
to satisfy investors. As such, firms would rather walk away from a successful project than pay
back investors. Anticipating this, investors will choose not to invest in firms that are known to
be “low” type.
3.3.2 Credit Ratings and Public Signals
The credit rating agency assigns a rating, κ {A, B,C}, to each firm. The probability that a firm
receives a given rating is determined by its type, θ, and the amount of resources that the firm
chooses to invest in the ratings process, i. Let piκ(θ, i) be the probability that a firm of type θ
that invested i receives rating κ. I assume that piA(θ, i) is increasing in i for every θ whereas both
piB(θ, i) and piC(θ, i) are decreasing in i. Thus, as firms increase i they increase the probability
that they receive a high rating. I assume the rating production functions are linear and obey the
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following conditions:
piA(g, i) > piA(b, i) ∀i (3.1)
piC(g, i) < piC(b, i) ∀i (3.2)
Simply put, these assumptions rule out the possibility of equilibria in which the pool of A-rated
firms is more likely to default on average than the pool of C-rated firms. In essence this ensures
that the ratings are informative, in that higher ratings are correlated with lower default rates.
The functional forms chosen are as follows:







piA(b, i) = (σb2 + σ
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piB(g, i) = σ
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piB(b, i) = σb2(1 − i)
piC(g, i) = σ
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Using these functional forms, σg1 > 0 and σ
b
1 > 0 ensure that Assumptions (3.1) and (3.2) hold.
The noisy public signal, ν{H, L}, that may be correlated with a firm’s type, is seen by
investors and firms. The distribution of ν is as follows: Pr{H|g} = Pr{L|b} = ω and Pr{L|g} =
Pr{H|b} = 1 − ω. One can interpret ω as the probability that the public signal is accurate, i.e.
the probability that good firms get high public signals, and bad firms get low public signals. As
constructed, if ω > 1/2 the public signal is informative in that signal H is correlated with type
g and L with b.11
3.3.3 Firms
Firms differ in their unobservable type, θ {g, b}. The distribution of θ is as follows: Pr{g} = λ
and Pr{b} = 1 − λ. Firms are endowed with a risky project that will return y with probability
11If ω < 1/2, the public signal is still correlated with the firm’s type. In this case, the high public signal would
be positively correlated with bad firms, and vice versa. Thus the public signal would still be informative, though
the labels would not accurately describe the firms.
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γθ, where γg > γb, and 0 otherwise. The firm must receive an investment of fixed size d = 1 to
start the project. The distribution of types is common knowledge.
The timing for firms is as follows. The firm first observes its noisy signal, ν, and then
chooses the level of resources to invest in rating activities, i, in order to maximize the expected
value of the project net of borrowing costs. At this point the firms do not know their rating and
thus the expectation is taken over both the probability the project will return y given ν and the
distribution of ratings given ν and i as the rating will influence the borrowing cost R(κ, ν).
Given gross interest rates R(κ, ν), the firm’s problem is the following:
V(ν) = max
i
− c(i) + Eθ,h[1(κ, ν)(y − R(κ, ν)|ν)] (3.3)
subject to: i[0, 1]
I assume c(i) is increasing, c′(0) = 0 and c′(1) = ∞. The indicator function 1(κ, ν) is equal to
1 when an investment is received, and 0 otherwise. It is allowed to depend on κ and ν as both
are available to investors when they make their decision to invest.
The benefits of a higher i are lower expected borrowing cost, R(κ, ν), as the expected rating
is higher, and an increased probability of receiving an investment. The firm weighs these
benefits against the cost of investing in the rating process, c(i). As firms do not observe their
type, the public signal determines the level of investment that balances these expected benefits
and costs. Thus, as firms that receive the low public signal L may still be of g-type there is still
a benefit to investing in the rating. Conversely, firms that receive the high public signal H have
some assurance of their being of g-type, but may in fact be of b-type.
3.3.4 Investors
Investors are endowed with one unit of investment capital which they can invest in either firm
debt at the market interest rate, R(κ, ν), or government debt at the risk-free interest rate, r.
Before making this decision, investors observe a credit rating, κ, and public signal, ν, from the
firm. If the investor chooses to purchase firm debt, she will then be repaid R(κ, ν) at the end of
the period if the firm honours its debt. Investors face no barriers to entry in the market for debt
and investment capital is available in perfectly elastic supply. The expected investor return to
firm debt rated κ with signal ν is:
Eθ[R(κ, ν)|κ, ν]. (3.4)
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3.3.5 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a set of interest rates, R∗ = {R∗(κ, ν)}ν{H,L}
κ{A,B,C}, and rating investment allocati-
ons, {i∗ν}ν{H,L} such that:
1. given R∗, i∗ν solves (3.3);
2. (free entry condition) investors do not earn excess returns:
Eθ[R∗(κ, ν)|κ, ν] = r ∀κ, ν
3.3.6 Solution to the Firm’s Problem







κ(g) + (1 − ω)(1 − λ)γbpi′κ(b)






(1 − ω)λγgpi′κ(g) + ω(1 − λ)γbpi′κ(b)
(1 − ω)λ + ω(1 − λ) (y − R
∗(κ, L))1(κ, L) (3.6)
where (c′)−1 is the inverse marginal cost function. In words, firms choose i such that the
marginal benefit of investing in the ratings process (lower interest rates and a higher chance of
investment) are equal to the marginal cost.
3.3.7 Investor’s Decision
Investors observe a firm’s credit rating κ and the public signal ν. Knowing these, and given
equilibrium interest rates R∗, the investor will decide to invest if
R∗(κ, ν) < y.
This ensures the firm will repay if the project is successful. More precisely:
1(κ, ν) =
1 if R
∗(κ, ν) < y
0 if R∗(κ, ν) ≥ y.
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3.3.8 Interest Rates





ωλpiκ(g, i∗H)γg + (1 − ω)(1 − λ)piκ(b, i∗H)γb
ωλpiκ(g, i∗H) + (1 − ω)(1 − λ)piκ(b, i∗H)
(3.8)
R∗(κ, L) =r
(1 − ω)λpiκ(g, i∗L)γg + ω(1 − λ)piκ(b, i∗L)γb
(1 − ω)λpiκ(g, i∗L) + ω(1 − λ)piκ(b, i∗L)
(3.9)
3.4 Results
In this section I first show that firms will decrease i when the accuracy of the public signal
increases. This is due to the within-rating class compositional change that occurs when firms
change i. This result leads to Proposition 3.4.2, the main result of the paper. Proposition 3.4.2
states that an increase in the accuracy of the public signal will decrease the number of firms
with an A rating, while increasing the number of firms with a B or C rating, a shift which
matches the real-life change in the ratings distribution described above.
Proposition 3.4.1 The equilibrium investment in the ratings process for firms with signal ν, i∗ν,
is decreasing in public signal accuracy, ω.
Proof Suppose not. Then for some ω, i∗ν increases in ω. This implies that the probability of
getting an A (C) rating is increasing (decreasing) for firms with signal ν. The relevant rating
production functions are as follows:
Pr (A|g, ν) ≡ piA(g, iν) = σg1 + (σg2 + σg3)iν
Pr (A|b, ν) ≡ piA(b, iν) = (σb2 + σb3)iν
Pr (C|g, ν) ≡ piC(g, iν) = σg3(1 − iν)
Pr (C|b, ν) ≡ piC(b, iν) = σb1 + σb3(1 − iν).
Most directly relevant to investors is the probability that a firm is a certain type, conditional
on the observed rating and signal, as the firm’s type determines the probability the investment
will pay off. Employing Bayes’ rule and the law of total probability, the probability that a firm
is type θ conditional on observing κ and ν is:
Pr(θ|κ, ν) = Pr(κ|θ, ν)Pr(ν|θ)Pr(θ)
Pr(κ|θ, ν)Pr(ν|θ)Pr(θ) + Pr(κ|θ¯, ν)Pr(ν|θ¯)Pr(θ¯) .
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In particular, the relevant probabilities are:
Pr(g|A,H) = piA(g, iH)ωλ
piA(g, iH)ωλ + piA(b, iH)(1 − ω)(1 − λ) ,
Pr(g|A, L) = piA(g, iL)(1 − ω)λ
piA(g, iL)(1 − ω)λ + piA(b, iL)ω(1 − λ) ,
Pr(g|C,H) = piC(g, iH)ωλ
piC(g, iH)ωλ + piC(b, iH)(1 − ω)(1 − λ) ,
Pr(g|C, L) = piC(g, iL)(1 − ω)λ
piC(g, iL)(1 − ω)λ + piC(b, iL)ω(1 − λ) .
Under assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, each of these probabilities is decreasing in i.12 Thus, the
proportion of firms with an A or C rating and an H or L signal that are g-type will be lower if
firms increase i. Conversely, the proportion that are b-type will be higher.
As the pool of firms with an A or C rating and ν signal now contains proportionately less
type g and more type b firms, the expected default rate of the pool will increase. The corre-




rωλ(1 − ω)(1 − λ)[piκ(G, i∗ν)pi′κ(b) − piκ(B, i∗ν)pi′κ(g)](γg − γb)
(Pr(g, ν, κ|i∗ν)γg + Pr(B, ν, κ|i∗ν)γb)2 , (3.10)
where piκ(θ, i) is the probability of receiving rating κ at type θ and investment i, and pi′κ(θ) is the
derivative of piκ with respect to i. This expression is positive, indicating that R∗(κ|ν) is increasing
in i∗ν for κ equal to A or C.
13 The interest rate increases because the proportion of type g firms
is decreasing (and thus that of b types is increasing) in the pool of A or C-rated, ν-signal firms.
So, a random A or C-rated, ν-signal firm is now more likely to be b type and the default rate of
firms in this pool has increased.
As the interest rate increases, so does the borrowing cost. The net return to the project for
the firm, y − R, is therefore lowered, along with the marginal benefit of investment in ratings.







κ(g)γg + (1 − ω)(1 − λ)pi′κ(b)γb





− (1 − ω)λpi
′
κ(g)γg + ω(1 − λ)pi′κ(b)γb
(1 − ω)λ + ω(1 − λ) (3.12)
Note that the interest rate for B rated firms, R∗(B, ν), does not change with i∗ν and therefore has
12See Appendix B.2.







for κ {A,C} (which holds whenever σg1 > 0 and σb1 > 0 (see Appendix B.2))
and γg > γb.
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no bearing on the marginal benefit.14 As the marginal benefit decreases, an individual firm
would like to decrease their investment in the ratings process, as i∗ν = MBH(R
∗)
1
α−1 . This is a
contradiction.
Proposition 3.4.1 states that when the public signal becomes more accurate, firms that re-
ceive both the H and L signal will decrease their investment in the ratings process. The result
implies that the number of firms that receive an A rating will decrease, conditional on a public
signal. This is clearly a strong indication that the unconditional number of firms that receive an
A rating will decrease. However, it remains to show that this is indeed the case as an increase
in ω will also affect the distribution of public signals. Proposition 3.4.2 characterizes the con-
ditions that ensure the effect of decreased investment in ratings dominates any distributional
effect.
Proposition 3.4.2 Consider ω1, ω2. Let µ j(κ) be the measure of firms rated κ if ω = ω j. Then,
for any ω1 < ω2,
µ1(A) > µ2(A), µ1(B) < µ2(B), and µ1(C) < µ2(C).
if








Proof Let iν(ω) be the investment chosen by firms with signal ν if the public signal accuracy
is ω. By Proposition (3.4.1), iν(ω1) > iν(ω2) for any ω1 < ω2. As piκ(θ, iν) is increasing in
i for κ = A and decreasing in i for κ = B,C, it follows that piA(θ, iν(ω1)) > piA(θ, iν(ω2)),
piB(θ, iν(ω1)) < piB(θ, iν(ω2)), and piC(θ, iν(ω1)) < piC(θ, iν(ω2)).







As ω increases there are two effects. The first effect is due to the decrease in i articulated
above, which changes the rating probabilities conditional on each public signal. The second
effect is due to the change in the distribution of H and L signals, conditional of firm type, θ. As
ω increases, the probability that a g-type (b-type) firm will receive signal H (L) is larger, and
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conversely the probability that a g-type (b-type) firm will receive signal L (H) is smaller. As
can be seen in Equation (3.13), these probabilities weight each term of the summation. Thus,
both effects must be taken into account to determine the change in the ratings distribution that
is caused by ω.














+ (1 − ω)∂iL
∂ω
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are negative. This implies that the second and third terms of Equa-
tion (3.14) are both negative (positive) if pi′κ(θ) is positive (negative), as is the case for firms
rated A (B,C). Finally, µ(A) (µ(B), µ(C)) is decreasing (increasing) in ω if either of the follo-
wing conditions hold:








These conditions ensure that the change in the composition of signal-type pairs does not domi-
nate the change in the probability that each signal-type pair receives a given rating.15
The intuition for this result is straightforward. As all firms decrease their investment in the
ratings process when ω increases, the probability that a firm with either public signal receives
an A rating is decreasing, while the probability they receive a B or C rating is increasing.
Provided the indirect effect of the change in the distribution of signal-type pairs due the increase
in ω does not dominate the direct effect of the ratings change, the distribution of ratings will
evolve as described.
As interest rates or bond prices directly reflect the information available to the market, it is
natural to consider the implications of an increase in the accuracy of public information on this
front. Proposition (3.4.3) states that, as the public signal becomes more accurate, the dispersion
of bond prices within a rating category will increase. This is because investors are more sure
15Note that these are sufficient, but not necessary, conditions. Weaker conditions are easily obtainable, but lack
any immediate economic interpretation.
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that a firm that receives a H signal is a g-type firm, and also more sure that those with a L signal
are b-types. The difference in interest rates will increase to reflect this.
Proposition 3.4.3 Consider ω1, ω2. Let R j(A, ν) be the equilibrium interest rate for firms rated
A with signal ν when ω = ω j. Then, for any ω1 < ω2,
R1(A, L) − R1(A,H) < R2(A, L) − R2(A,H).
Proof The proof only requires showing that R∗(A,H) decreasing in ω and R∗(A, L) increasing
in ω. Therefore R∗(A, L) − R∗(A,H) increasing in ω. See Appendix B.2.
3.5 The Variation of Bond Spreads
The implication of Proposition 3.4.3 is that the dispersion of interest rates within a rating class
is increasing. To confirm this in the data, I use the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database.
This is a comprehensive database of publicly-offered U.S. bonds. All of the information about
the bonds themselves is sourced from bond prospectus while the ratings and CUSIP data are
obtained directly from the source.16 The linked issuer and issue data covers 77% of U.S.
firms. Furthermore, the ratings data includes ratings from the 4 major credit rating agencies
(Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch, and Duff&Phelps).
Due to the low number of AAA-rated firms (and therefore bond issues from these firms)
I use 4 year bins, starting in 1990. I take the yield to maturity spread over Treasury bonds
matched by maturity at the offering date. Following the literature, I use the spread over treasury
bonds as this measures the risk and default premium, which is germane to the analysis.17 I
restrict the sample to fixed coupon bonds for consistency in the yield to maturity calculation,
which eliminates at most 1% of the observations in a given year. To match the sample used in
the analysis of the ratings distribution change, I further restrict the sample by omitting firms in
the financial sector, though there are many. The resulting sample is summarized in Table 3.2.
To document the pattern implied by Proposition 3.4.3 in the data, I plot the distribution
of interest rate spreads over treasury for each rating class and further split the sample into an
“early” (1990s) and “late” (2000s) time period in Figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. The dispersion of
bond spreads does seem to be increasing in the two investment-grade classes (AAA or AA and
A or BBB), especially so for the high investment-grade class.
16CUSIP is the Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures, used to identify securities and issu-
ers.
17There is also a tax premium in the price of corporate bonds as interest payments on these bonds are taxed
at the state level, while interest payments on government bonds are not. See Elton, Gruber, Agrawal & Mann
(2001).
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Table 3.2: Observations in each rating-period bin
Ratings 1990-93 1994-97 1998-2001 2002-05 2006-09 Total
All 1,080 1,624 2,422 2,071 1,551 8,748
AAA/AA 223 228 287 134 91 963
A/BBB 719 980 1,346 866 902 4,813
SG 138 416 789 1,071 558 2,972
One concern is that the increasing dispersion is simply caused by an increasing mean, as
one consequence of this is an increase in the standard deviation. As the coefficient of varia-
tion is immune to these perturbations it is more suited for this analysis. Therefore, to further
substantiate the aforementioned pattern I calculate the coefficient of variation for each rating
class and period as defined in Table 3.2. I construct 95% confidence intervals to determine
whether any change in the coefficient of variation is statistically significant. The method used
to construct the confidence intervals can be found in Appendix B.1. The result of this approach
can be seen in Figure 3.9. There is a large, statistically significant, increase in the coefficient of
variation over the sample period in both the AAA and AA (which increased by 56%) and the A
and BBB (29%) rating classes. Curiously, there is also a statistically significant decrease in the
speculative grade rating class (26%), though this disappears by the end of the sample period.
3.6 Discussion
In the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, previous efforts to regulate capital markets have
been questioned. A significant part of this scrutiny has been directed towards credit rating
agencies (CRAs) and their role in mispricing risk. Though CRA behaviour has been studied in
the context of other asset markets, the corporate bond market has been neglected. This paper is
a step towards understanding the corporate bond market, specifically how firms behave when
investors use both credit ratings and public information to make investment decisions and price
bonds.
As public information has proliferated, its usefulness to investors has increased. Investors
can now place more weight on this information as they evaluate firms. It is costly for firms
to comply with the requirements of the CRAs as they improve their rating, whereas public
information is provided without cost. Thus, firms are able to convey their creditworthiness
at a reduced cost if investors use relatively more public information to make their investment
decisions and if the market price of their debt is determined in part by both credit ratings and
public information.
I construct a model that captures the role of credit ratings and public information in the cor-
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Figure 3.6: Spread over Treasury for AAA and AA bonds.
porate bond market to provide an explanation of the ratings distribution shift. Proposition 3.4.1
states that firms will devote less resources to improving their credit rating as public information
proliferates. This leads to the main result of the paper, Proposition 3.4.2, which shows that the
number of firms with the highest rating will decrease, while the number of firms with medi-
ocre and low ratings increase, when information proliferates. Thus, the change in the rating
distribution of the model matches that in the data, lending credence to proposed mechanism.
The shift in the credit ratings distribution is drastic. There has been a 70% decrease in the
number of AAA or AA-rated firms, while the number of A or BBB-rated firms has increased
by 77% and the number issuing speculative debt has increased by 129%. This stark shift away
from the top ratings towards the lower end of the rating distribution cannot be explained by
changes in the leverage ratios of firms, nor can it be explained by mergers or changing CRA
standards.
Proposition 3.4.3 states that, as the accuracy of public information increases, so too will
the dispersion of interest rates within a rating group. The intuition for this result is straightfor-
ward: as investors now learn more about firms through public information they are able more
accurately price debt above the accuracy provided by credit ratings. Using new data, I show
that this is indeed the case for investment grade debt over the last 20 years. The coefficient of
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Figure 3.7: Spread over Treasury for A and BBB bonds.
variation has increased by 56% for AAA or AA-rated debt and by 29% for A or BBB-rated
debt. This dramatic increase in price dispersion is previously undocumented.
As certain large investors are required to purchase highly rated debt or have lower capital
requirements for investment grade debt holdings (as opposed to speculative), it is necessary
for many firms to attain an investment grade credit rating to gain access to this segment of the
market. Firms can also comply with CRA standards to improve their rating as this will lower
their borrowing costs. This is costly, however, and as public information has become more
reliable firms need no longer improve their credit rating to lower their borrowing cost.
Understanding how firms use credit ratings is important as regulation of the credit rating
agencies has become a pressing policy issue following the financial crisis of 2007-2009. To
this point, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates the creation of an Office of Credit Ratings to enhance
regulation of these agencies.18 Much of this enhanced regulation will increase the bureaucratic
burden of issuing a rating, the cost of which may be passed on to firms. If this comes to pass,
my research suggests that firms will devote fewer resources to ratings, further lowering the
reliability of credit ratings.
Recognizing this behaviour is integral to understanding capital markets. Regulatory chan-
18The official name of this act is ‘The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.’
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Figure 3.8: Spread over Treasury for BBB or lower bonds.
ges, such as the Dodd-Frank Act, which do not take this channel into account risk being in-
effective, or worse, counter-productive. Also, the credit rating distribution is used by some as
a measure of the aggregate riskiness of firms in the economy. In this paper I show that firms
need not be riskier for the ratings distribution to shift towards lower ratings.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper in part seeks to answer the question: “Why are the highly rated firms disappearing?”
The change in the distribution of firm ratings has been dramatic and has not thus far been
documented in the academic literature. Possible explanations for this pattern, such as evolving
credit rating agency standards, more highly levered firms, and firms merging, are explored and
rejected.
Instead I propose a mechanism that captures the increase in the proliferation of firm infor-
mation. Investors no longer rely solely on credit ratings to relay firm information and firms
need no longer devote resources to unproductive ratings activities. Thus the demand for high
ratings is lessened from both investors and firms, a story consistent with the changes purported
by the financial press. However, due to regulations that require certain types of investors to
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Figure 3.9: Coefficient of variation with 95% confidence intervals, by rating class.
hold only investment grade assets, credit ratings retain a certain value. Considering this, it is





The household consumption-savings decision and consumption inequality have been impor-
tant areas of research in economics, but some aspects remain unexplored to their full extent.
In particular, I focus on the different level of access that households have to financial markets,
the effect this has on household savings and investment, and what this means for consumption
inequality. In this paper, differential access is caused by costs which are not proportional to
income and thus cause heterogeneous behaviour across income levels. The motivation for this
study comes from, in part, the empirical rejection of perfect risk sharing, i.e., that households
are able to insure against all idiosyncratic shocks.1 By adding a fixed cost for market partici-
pation, I show that the model exhibits the desired degree of risk sharing by controlling access
on the extensive margin, while allowing income-rich households full consumption insurance.
This further restricts the degree of risk sharing relative to the debt constraint models (discussed
below) on an aggregate level. From a theoretical standpoint, the benefit of this fixed cost is that
the market segmentation is endogenous and thus households can pay for access at any point in
their lifetime.
The model of Endogenously Segmented Markets (ESM) developed herein exhibits a mix-
ture of perfect risk sharing and no risk sharing in different segments of the economy. In order
to justify such a model, there should be evidence of two features: heterogeneous market parti-
cipation and a fixed cost for access. The former can be seen in the high concentration of asset
holdings and wealth in the upper portion of the income distribution. Wolff (2010) finds that the
1See, for example, Attanasio & Davis (1996) who show that the standard Arrow-Debreu complete markets
model cannot explain the joint distribution of earnings and consumption in U.S. cross-sectional data.
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top quintile by income holds 44% of their net worth in real estate, business equity, stock and
bonds compared to 14% for the middle 3 quintiles in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
in 2007. Furthermore, the author finds that 55% of the total value of life insurance is held
by the top 10%. Studying the same sample, Guvenen (2007a) finds that 90% of non-housing
wealth and 98% of stocks are owned by the richest 20% of the U.S. population by income. By
most measures, the distribution of assets is heavily skewed to the left.
A fixed cost for access is not so easily observed. Following Guvenen (2007a), it is meant to
capture both implicit and explicit costs endured by those who trade in financial markets. These
would include time and effort costs of tasks that include filing a more complicated tax return,
membership or access costs to internet trading houses, brokerage fees that aren’t “per trade”
and costs of information acquisition. Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) finds that modest costs ($50 to
$260) are enough to explain the decision of most non-participants in the stock market.
The basic models on household consumption and savings fall into two classes. The first are
the incomplete market models such as Aiyagari (1994) or Huggett (1993) in which infinitely-
lived households use “precautionary savings” to smooth their consumption. More recently,
Storesletten, Telmer & Yaron (2004) use the same framework in a life-cycle model. Though
this market structure is useful as a lower bound for the asset set of an entire economy, there
are clearly more opportunities to smooth consumption (such as disability insurance and ot-
her financial instruments). Saving with a single bond is arguably a more apt description of
low-income household behaviour, as this group rarely holds their wealth in assets other than
their primary residence. This can be seen in the SCF where households with income under
$15,000 in 2007 make up 13.3% of households but hold only 1.2% of total stock holdings,
either indirectly or directly. In the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the asset income
of households that earn more than $30,000 is over three times that of those that earn less than
$30,000. The second class of models, such as the model studied in Kehoe & Levine (1993), re-
strict asset purchases in a more natural manner: debt constraints. In these models a household
(or an agent) cannot commit to paying back any amount of debt which would make autarky
more appealing, though they have access to assets which span the state space. In this sense, risk
sharing is restricted on the intensive margin, i.e., households cannot borrow or lend as much as
they wish but may purchase assets for every state.2
Krueger & Perri (2006) determine that the degree of risk sharing in the economy would
seem to be in between that of a simple bond economy (incomplete markets) and an economy
with limited commitment (restricted complete markets). The authors come to this conclusion
as the increase in consumption variance from 1980 to 2004, as measured in the Consumer
2Kocherlakota (1996) shows that complete risk sharing is in fact possible in this environment if agents are
sufficiently patient.
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Expenditure Survey (CEX), is lower than that predicted by a bond economy and higher than
that predicted by a debt-constrained economy.3 It may be, however, that each of the basic
models accurately describes a certain segment of the economy, while inaccurately describing
the economy as a whole. As mentioned above, the single bond economy seems to suitably
describe the behaviour of low-income households, while the observed wealth holdings of high-
income households indicates that they have access to a wider class of assets.
It is important to study economic inequality as it bears directly on policy concerns such as
education and social security. Most of the existing literature has focused on the inequality of
income or wealth and ignored, to a certain degree, the inequality of consumption. This is sur-
prising as consumption, not income or wealth, is included in the household objective function
and thus it should be of primary concern. A recent paper by Heathcoate, Perri & Violante
(2010) documents the change in economic inequality in the United States by examining chan-
ges in the variance of wages, hours worked, income, earnings and consumption. The authors
find that the increase in consumption inequality is less than that of income inequality and sug-
gest that this implies some part of the income process is insurable, but not all.4 This is only
true if, in response to rising income variance, all households behave in a similar fashion which
I argue is not the case. The main result of this paper is that the observed increase in consump-
tion inequality misrepresents the true welfare effect of an increase in income variance. This is
because the increase in income variance has two effects on the unconditional variance of log
consumption: (1) an increase in group risk sharing for high income households (as group mar-
ket participation increases), resulting in lower consumption variance; and (2) a direct increase
in consumption variance for low income households, as the fixed cost is more restrictive and
market participation does not increase.
To further develop the ESM model, I examine the effects of a change in the persistence of
income shocks. An increase in persistence will decrease the risk faced by a household, as it is
subject to fewer shocks but will also increase the difference in lifetime utility caused by a high
or low income shock. The model predicts a decrease in market participation when persistence
is raised, suggesting that in this environment the former effect is more important for household
welfare. Finally, I show that when the financial markets are interpreted as traditional insu-
rance markets (such as for disability or life insurance), the ESM model supports two empirical
observations which are seemingly opposed: namely, the negative correlation between income
and insurance purchases and the positive correlation between wealth and insurance purcha-
3I refer to the within-group (log of) consumption variance. The between-group variance is lower in the data
than both of the basic models. The within-group variance is of more interest as it reflects the level of risk sharing
in the economy.
4The authors also confirm that the samples used by the PSID, CEX and CPS are comparable, lending justifi-
cation to the use of income and consumption data from the different surveys in the same study.
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ses. The intuition is that wealth is used for precautionary savings which become redundant for
households that can afford the fixed cost of market participation.
Recently there have been empirical studies attempting to measure the degree of risk sharing
while accounting for different household characteristics. Blundell, Pistaferri & Preston (2008)
estimate an income process from PSID data and consumption demand functions from CEX
data and find evidence for higher risk sharing amongst the college educated and older genera-
tions. Guvenen (2007a) finds empirical evidence in the PSID for perfect risk-sharing amongst
non-stockholders but rejects perfect risk sharing for stockholders, who are generally more we-
althy. Gervais & Klein (2010) confirm this result though they find that “the degree of risk
sharing is nevertheless quite high.” As clarification, Narita & Narita (2009), who construct
a synthetic panel from the CEX, find that, though stockholders face more consumption risk
than do non-stockholders, they are able to insure a greater proportion of their total risk. These
results suggest that certain household characteristics allow it different consumption insurance
opportunities and that a model which incorporates these features is more suited to describing
the effects of inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model, income process and equilibrium
concept are discussed in Section 2. Results are provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes and
discusses potential directions for future work.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Environment
The environment is populated by a finite number of households, each of which lives for T
discrete periods. Households derive utility from consumption and discount future utility by a
factor β. The lifetime utility of a household is represented by












. The contemporaneous utility
function, u, is assumed to be continuously differentiable and concave.
The uncertainty in the model arises through fluctuations in each household’s income, yij,t(st) =
Xijw(st), where X
i
j reflects the household’s age and type
5 and w(st) are the wages at st, the state-
5This heterogeneity is meant to capture fixed characteristics that would affect a household’s income, such as
education level, and the life-cycle of income.
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event pair.6 Let si, j,t denote the history of realized states from age 1 through j for household i
born at time t and st the history of realized states for all households. Each st is drawn from the
set S of all possible states, thus si, j,tS j and stS t. As the birth period does not vary over the
household’s lifetime, I suppress this in the notation for simplicity and rewrite si, j,t as si, j. The






β jpi(s j|si, j−1)u(cij(s j|si, j−1)), (4.2)
where pi(s j|si, j−1) is the probability of realizing state s j given the history si, j−1.
Financial Markets
Certain households have access to markets in which they may purchase one-period Arrow
securities, all of which pay one unit of consumption in a single state. These securities span the
state space. To gain access to these markets, households must pay a fixed cost, η, within every
period that they wish to purchase these state-contingent assets. For instance, a household could
pay η to purchase Arrow securities at time t which then mature at time t + 1, and could pay η
again at time t + 1 for the right to purchase securities that mature at time t + 2. All households
may trade risk-free bonds in every period. There is full commitment for both complete and
incomplete markets.
Household Problem
The main household problem can be represented recursively by two separate problems: that
of a household with and without access to complete markets (and thus perfect insurance). Let
q(st+1|st) be the price of a security given history st and q0(st) be the price of a bond. Denote
ai, j
j+1
as the vector of security holdings and bi, jj+1 as the bond holdings for household i at age j
the payoffs for which are realized in j + 1. The problem of a household with access is then




u(c) + βE[Vin( j + 1, s′, a′, b′)|s], (4.3)
max
a′,b′






q(s′|s)a(s′|s j) + q0b′ + η ≤ y(s j) + b + a(s j). (4.4)
6The state contains the realization of uncertainty for all households at time t.
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The problem of a household without access is




u(c) + βE[Vin( j + 1, s′, 0, b′)|s], (4.5)
max
b′
u(c) + βE[Vout( j + 1, s′, 0, b′)|s]
}
subject to
c + q0b′ ≤ y(s j) + b + a(s j). (4.6)
For ease of notation I have suppressed the time superscripts and subscripts and represent the
state at time t and t+1 with s and s′ respectively. Note that in (4.5) and (4.6) the household may
still have non-zero holdings of the Arrow securities as access to complete markets may have
been purchased in the previous period. The main household problem is simply the maximum
of the two sub-problems:
VES M( j, s, a, b) = max {Vin( j, s, a, b),Vout( j, s, a, b)} . (4.7)
This problem can be solved through backwards induction from age T using the appropriate
terminal condition.
4.2.2 Equilibrium
The environment is analyzed as a small open economy. It is assumed that all of the trade in
assets occurs between a household and a large financial industry so that both households and the





is set to be actuarially fair using a no arbitrage condition. Thus the prices are







This ensures that purchasing one unit of consumption for sure in the next period costs the
same amount using either Arrow securities or bonds, as the sum of the security prices across
all possible states in t + 1 is equal to the price of the risk-free bond. An equilibrium is an
allocation
{
(ai, j(s j+1|si, j))s j+1S , bij+1
}T
j=1
for every household i and prices as defined in (4.8) such
that every household solves (4.7).
In general, a closed-form solution to the participation decision is not available. Note, ho-
wever, that once market access is obtained a household is able to attain complete consumption
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insurance by equating the marginal utility of consumption in and across all histories:
u′(c(s j|s j−1)) = u′(c(s¯ j|s j−1)),∀s j, s¯ jS ,∀s j−1S j−1 for j = 1, . . . ,T, (4.9)
u′(c(s j|s j−1)) = u′(c(s j+1|s j)),∀s j, s j+1S ,∀s j−1, s jS j−1 for j = 2, . . . ,T − 1. (4.10)
Equations (4.9) and (4.10) are standard Euler equations. Households are thus guaranteed a
constant consumption of Xw¯, where w¯ is the average expected wage from the period after the
household enters the complete markets agreement until T .
To further characterize the ESM model different steady states are compared. A steady state
partial equilibrium has constant population weights, ωi, which reflect the different possible
household types, represented by values of X. Cohorts exist in equal number for a given house-
hold type. As I restrict entry into the complete markets agreement until the second period of a
household’s life, the fraction of households of a given type that could possibly have access is
T−1
T . Thus I consider this fraction to be complete participation.
4.2.3 Income Process
Household earnings consist of a heterogenous part, X, and a stochastic idiosyncratic part, w.






Define σ2X and σ
2
w as the between-group and within-group variance of log earnings, respecti-
vely. The value of X is permanent while shocks to w are transitory. Though X does not depend
on time, it may depend on the household’s age, which is indexed by j.
The values for the household-specific variable, X, are chosen to reflect the mean income
for different levels of education, as specified in the Current Population Survey (CPS) for 2007.
These values are then normalized to obtain a value relative to those who attain a college degree
and no more. See Table 4.1 for the results. I construct the other portion of household earnings,
w, as shocks that takes on the values ±εt with equal probability, independent of history.7 The
probabilities are then simply pi(s j+1|s j) = 0.5 for all s j+1 and s j. In order to determine the se-
quence of idiosyncratic income shocks I decompose the wages into a permanent and transitory
part, as measured in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The method is identical to
the ‘moments in levels’ method in Heathcoate, Perri and Violante (2010). As an increase in
the magnitude of income shocks and different wage growth across skill cohorts would both
generate the required increase in income variance, it is important to justify the use of income
shocks. As argued in Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004), differences in wage growth would
7The variance of w is 12 (ln(1 − ε)2 + ln(1 + ε)2) − 14 (ln(1 − ε) + ln(1 + ε))2.
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Table 4.1: Mean income by education level.
Education Actual Relative
Level Income Income
<High School 21,484 0.541







Source: Current Population Survey.
lead to constant changes in consumption inequality if households were able to borrow against
future wage growth and wished to smooth consumption. Constant changes are not observed
however, which lends credence to the use of income shocks.
I choose to vary the change in the persistent part of log earnings variance by changing
the frequency at which households receive income shocks. High frequency shocks imply low
persistence, and vice versa. Changing the persistence can affect the participation choice in
two ways. First, under standard preference assumptions, the resulting difference in lifetime
utility between persistent low and high shocks is greater than is the difference between purely
transient low and high shocks, when these shocks are uninsured. Second, the household will
see fewer shocks if persistence is high, thus reducing the uncertainty over a life cycle. The
qualitative results of changing persistence will be shown below. In order to construct the life-
cycle profile that I use to calibrate the model, I introduce income growth following Guvenen
(2007b). He uses an annual linear growth rate of 0.07 for those who attain some college or less
and 0.12 for those with a college degree of higher.
4.3 Results
To calibrate the ESM model I scale wage growth and cost of entry to match the life-cycle profile
of log consumption variance in the CEX, as found in Deaton and Paxson (1994), at the median
transitory income variance and with population weights for X.8 This target for calibration is
8These weights are taken from the CPS and can be found in table 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Model calibration and estimated cross-sectional variance of log consumption.
Note: Data is the cross-sectional variance of log consumption from the CEX as generated by a
cohort and age dummy variable regression. Model shows the result of the calibration. Source:
Consumer Expenditure Survey.
used by both Guvenen (2007b) and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004).9 To construct this
profile I follow the method of Deaton and Paxson (1994) and run a dummy-variable regression
on the variance of log (non-durable) consumption for each age-cohort pair. The age effects are
then scaled so that the coefficients match the unconditional variance of a reference age group,
on average (age 42 in this paper.) The scaled age dummy-variable coefficients and the profile
generated by the model are plotted in figure 4.1. The discount rate β is set equal to 11+r where r
is the annual interest rate which I choose to be 4%. The calibrated value of the fixed cost, η, is
0.006. Note that this value is of the same magnitude found by Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), when
compared with the relative earnings in Table 4.1 as it translates to approximately $180.
The results of this calibration are then used to determine the degree of market participation
for each household type at each level of income variance by resolving for the steady state.
Figure 4.2 shows the degree of market participation for each household type at various levels
9The calibration results in an increase of 21 log-points in the model compared to a 20 log-point increase in
the data. Guvenen (2007b) finds a 21 point increase, Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) find that the increase
is 25 points and Deaton and Paxson (2004) also find a 25 point increase. Each paper uses the CEX sample from
1980 to 1990.
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Table 4.2: Mean consumption and within-group log consumption variance, various values of
ε.
Consumption Mean,Variance
Education Population Lowest ε Median ε Highest ε





<High School 12.50 0.57 0.17 0.57 0.20 0.57 0.23
High School 28.16 0.81 0.16 0.81 0.17 0.82 0.19
<College 18.53 0.86 0.15 0.86 0.17 0.86 0.18
College 8.10 1.03 0.14 1.03 0.16 1.03 0.17
Bachelor’s 17.37 1.46 0.11 1.44 0.10 1.44 0.12
Master’s 5.90 1.77 0.09 1.77 0.10 1.72 0.06
Doctorate 1.00 2.35 0.04 2.36 0.05 2.33 0.04
Professional 1.28 2.97 0.03 2.96 0.03 2.97 0.04
Source: Population weights from Current Population Survey.
of ε. Notice that as the transitory part of income variance increases it is the highly skilled
households that enter the complete markets agreement. This is a reflection of the higher relative
cost of entry facing the poorer households.
The change in market participation shown in Figure 4.2 demonstrates how the reaction to
increased income variance differs across households, but does not account for the relative sizes
of each type and so does not shed light on the aggregate change in market participation. In fact,
though large fractions of a type may enter, the total participation never exceeds 20%.
Table 4.2 shows the chosen population weights, the within-group log consumption variance
and the average consumption for different levels of ε. The largest changes in market access
occur for the high-income types, a group which represent 26% of the total population (or a
total weight of 24.27 using the type weights in Table 4.2). These are the only groups who see a
reduction in their average consumption as a larger proportion of this group chooses to pay the
fee for market entrance.
The remainder of the population, comprised of College, High School and less than High
School, represent 72% of the population. For these groups, notice that the average consumption
does not vary much even for large jumps in . Instead, the changes occur in the variance which
rises significantly for each group. This is because the increased income variance does not cause
increased market participation (for most households) and so no income is spent on entering the
complete markets. Thus the increase in income variance is passed through to within-group
consumption variance.
The measured consumption inequality increases over the period 1980-2004 discussed pre-
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Figure 4.2: Fraction in complete markets, by type
viously are typically interpreted at the aggregate level. The results I find here suggest that
this increase is primarily attributable to low-income households and aggregate changes bely
the changes felt by low-income households. Researchers ignoring differences in market access
caused by household income heterogeneity will fail to observe the full impact of increased
income inequality as the increase in low-earner consumption inequality will be partially offset
by the decrease in middle- and high-earner consumption inequality, as seen in Table 4.2.
4.3.1 Model Comparison
I now show that the ESM model can form a more accurate prediction of the consumption
variance found by Krueger and Perri (2006) than the two basic models discussed in the in-
troduction. To do this I set η = ∞ in (4.4) and re-simulate the model. This makes market
participation unaffordable and effectively restricts the households to purchasing only the risk-
free bond. With this change the model is equivalent to a simple incomplete markets (SIM)
model.
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The limited commitment complete markets model (LCCM) requires some explanation.
First, I define the punishment for default as exclusion from the market for bonds and Arrow
securities, or complete autarky, as is standard in the literature. I also impose a proportional
penalty for default in period T .10 The value of autarky is defined as:
Vaut(s) = u(c) + βE[Vaut(s′)] (4.12)
subject to
c ≤ y(s). (4.13)
Thus the household is subject to the full extent of the uncertainty in the earnings process. The
individual rationality constraint requires that the value of participation is never less than the
value of autarky. I can then define the the value of participation as (4.3) subject to (4.4) and the
additional constraint
ai(st) ≥Ai(st), ∀stS , t = 1, . . . ,T.
Ai(st) is determined numerically by the value of assets which makes the household indifferent
between paying back Ai(st) and permanently foregoing participation in securities markets. Wit-
hout commitment, no household would rationally pay back any more as the value of default is
greater than that of honouring their debt. Thus Ai solves
VLCCM(s, A, b) = VAut(s).
As in Krueger and Perri (2006), I solve for the efficient consumption allocations. These allo-
cations provide maximum risk sharing while satisfying the individual rationality constraints.
Agents with high income are awarded just enough to ensure they do not default and walk away
from the agreement.
Recall that the SIM and LCCM models over- and understate, respectively, the degree of
within-group consumption variance. Also, both models over-predict the between-group vari-
ance. In comparison to the SIM model, the ESM model predicts a lower degree of within-group
consumption inequality, which increases at a lower rate. This is shown in Figure 4.3. Clearly,
this is because only a fraction of the total population is limited to solely trading the risk-free
bond in the ESM model, while the entire population is restricted to this bond in the SIM model.
Also, the between-group consumption inequality is lower in the ESM than in the SIM model.
Note that these series would be increasing if I included an upward trend for permanent income
10Including this penalty eliminates equilibria with no borrowing. This is because autarky is not a punishment
for households in period T and if these households do not repay their debts, lending will unravel.
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variance in the income process.
The LCCM model shows no upward trend in within-group consumption inequality and re-
sides entirely below the variance predicted by the ESM model.11 The relatively low variance
reflects the fact that everyone is risk-sharing to a degree in this environment. These results sug-
gest that endogenous segmentation is a factor that leads to differential insurance opportunities
across households.
The next exercise attempts to determine whether increasing the persistence in the model
encourages more participation in the complete markets agreement. This can be verified by
decreasing the length of a period in the economy. If, for instance, the relevant portion of the
lifecycle is roughly 40 years, the model period will determine how often a household is faced
with a shock. The benchmark model is estimated using 5 periods, making each period 8 years
long. Increasing the model period to 10 would change the period length to 4 years. Thus the
households in the economy experience 5 more transient shocks to their income, which fully
persist for 4 years instead of 8.12
I simulate the ESM model under the described changes and then again with a model period
of 20 (which results in 20 shocks persisting for 2 years). The results can be seen in Figure 4.4.
The environment with increased persistence shows decreased complete markets participation,
indicating that the increased discrepancy between the continuation value after high and low
shocks is a less important factor than is the increased uncertainty caused by more frequent
shocks.
There is empirical evidence that insurance policy holdings are positively correlated with
income and negatively correlated with wealth (see Beenstock et al. (1988) and Brown et
al. (2000)). The ESM model supports both of these relationships, as shown by the correla-
tions in Table 4.3. To see this consider Figures 4.5 and 4.6. The mean bond holdings for those
with a college education or less (CL or less) and those with bachelor’s degrees (BA, with mean
income below $60,000 in the CPS) are very similar. This is also true in the series for those
earnings roughly $70,000 (MA) until their bond holdings drop from 0.115 to 0.053, a change
of 54%.
This dramatic change corresponds to a significant increase in complete market participation
which offers the households full consumption insurance (against temporary shocks) seen in
Figure 4.6 as the jump between the series for median and high variance. This jump also applies
to the second highest class of earners (Doc) in Figure 4.5, a group which goes from high to
total complete markets participation. Notice again that their bond holdings drop significantly
11Recall that the solution concept for the LCCM model was constrained efficiency, which determined the max-
imum degree of risk-sharing. Complete autarky is also an equilibrium in this environment. In that case the
consumption variance would obviously be much higher.
12This formulation is supported by Storesletten et al. (2004) who find evidence for near unit-root persistence.
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Figure 4.3: Within- and between-group variance of log-consumption
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Figure 4.4: Fraction in complete markets, by type
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Figure 4.5: Mean bond holdings for each class, 1980-2004
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Table 4.3: Simulated correlation between market participation and bonds holdings
Education Correlation
Level Coefficient p-value





and are similar to that of the other group with total participation (Pro). So, bond holdings
(or wealth) drop significantly as market participation increases, and those with higher incomes
more frequently attain full consumption insurance by participating in the complete markets.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper I studied the effect of a fixed cost for market participation on consumption va-
riance. To calibrate the model, I match the age profile of the variance of log consumption as
first reported in Deaton and Paxson (1994). This results in a modest fixed cost of $180, well
within the range of estimates provided by Vissing-Jørgensen (2002). In the model, permanent
income characteristics cause households to behave in a qualitatively different manner as costs
are not proportional to income or asset purchases. Thus access and therefore the effect of an
increase in income variance differs across groups. By analyzing the steady state responses to
an increase in the transient part of income variance similar to that experienced by the US from
1980 to 2004, I show that the ESM model is consistent with the data for within-group variance
of log consumption. This leads to the most important result of the paper: the observed increase
in consumption inequality understates the true welfare effect of an increase in income variance
as the consumption variance of high income households decreases while that of low income
households increases. Thus any increase in aggregate consumption inequality is driven entirely
by the low end of the income distribution.
An interesting avenue of future work is determining the effect of specific factors over which
households can differ. An example of this is the positive correlation between education and sa-
vings behaviour, conditional on income, as documented in Lawrance (1991). More specifically,
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) examine the relationship between financial education or literacy
on saving behaviour. The model can also be enriched by adding informational frictions in
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Figure 4.6: Fraction in complete markets, by year
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the risk sharing agreement as in Athreya, Tam and Young (2008) who study the transfer of
income risk to consumption variance in unsecured credit markets. As the age income profile
of consumption variance has been measured over the same sample period (1980 to 1990 in
each of the studies mentioned in this paper) measuring how this changes over time may inform




This thesis has examined three topics relating to debt. In Chapter 2, I study the use of personal
borrowing in the form of home equity loans by entrepreneurs to secure business financing du-
ring the Great Recession. In Chapter 3, I turned to the market for corporate bonds to study the
disappearance of highly-rated corporate debt. Finally, in Chapter 4, I investigated the impor-
tance of costly access to financial markets for households of different incomes.
In Chapter 2, I make the striking observation that, despite house prices decreasing during
the Great Recession, home equity loan balances increased, all while total debt did not change.
The primary source of the increased use of home equity borrowing was entrepreneurs. I inter-
pret this as evidence of binding financing constraints for entrepreneurs.
As entrepreneurs were not able to borrow during the credit crunch due to more stringent
loan standards and less bank lending to small businesses, home equity loans allowed entrepre-
neurs to survive the crisis. Personal loans were a substitute for business loans. This confirms
studies such as Quadrini (2000) that find that wealth is important for the entrepreneurship de-
cision but deepens the understanding of how, exactly, wealth is used by entrepreneurs. In this
case, housing wealth is used to ease credit constraints and to aid survival and entry. Of entre-
preneurs in 2007, surviving entrepreneurs had higher rates of homeownership and higher house
values relative to those that did not survive. Furthermore, continuing entrepreneurs increased
borrowing against their home, while exiting entrepreneurs did not. Entrants in 2009 had more
available housing wealth than those in 2007.
As discussed above, the drop in home equity resulted in 2007 entrepreneurs hiring fewer
employees and an increased exit rate, which in turn resulted in job loss as well. Using the
population weights provided with the SCF, changes in home equity, and the results obtained
above we can derive a rough estimate of the change to employment. On average, the drop
in home equity caused a drop of 0.23 employees per business for surviving entrepreneurs,
roughly 5% of the observed drop per business (4.3). Furthermore, the drop in home equity
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caused roughly 28,000 entrepreneurs to exit, bringing with them 340,000 employees.
King & Levine (1993) show that effective financial systems that support entrepreneurship
can have a significant impact on economic growth. This paper studies one channel that en-
trepreneurs might employ to finance their business when the usual financial channels are not
available to them. Though entrepreneurs were able to use home equity loans to survive the
Great Recession, it was not costless as more household wealth was exposed to business risk at
the height of the recession. Considering the influence entrepreneurs have on growth and em-
ployment (see, for example, Adelino, Schoar & Severino, 2012) policies that ease borrowing
constraints for entrepreneurs, such as the 7a loan program from the Small Business Adminis-
tration, are a potentially beneficial means to improve aggregate conditions.
In Chapter 3, I document the disappearance of firms with high-credit ratings and analyze
potential reasons for this change in the distribution credit ratings for firms. The change in
the credit-rating distribution has been dramatic and has not been documented in the academic
literature thus far. Possible explanations for this pattern, such as evolving credit rating agency
standards, more highly levered firms, and firms merging, are explored and rejected.
Instead I propose a mechanism that captures the increase in the proliferation of firm infor-
mation. Investors no longer rely solely on credit ratings to relay firm information and firms
need no longer devote resources to unproductive ratings activities. Thus the demand for high
ratings is lessened from both investors and firms, a story consistent with the changes purported
by the financial press. However, due to regulations that require certain types of investors to
hold only investment grade assets, credit ratings retain a certain value. Considering this, it is
the value of the highest ratings relative to other investment grade ratings that has diminished.
The primary testable implication of the model is an increase in the dispersion of interest
rates within a rating class. When the accuracy of the public signal is low, the interest rates given
to two firms with the same rating and different signals will be closer than when the accuracy
is high. In other words, public information does little to seperate borrowing costs across firms
if it is not accurate. In effect, the difference between interest rates increases with the accuracy
of public information as investors are more sure that these firms are of different underlying
quality. I show that this pattern is borne out between 1990 and 2010.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I studied the effect of a fixed cost for market participation on con-
sumption variance. In this chapter, I compared the qualitative and quantitative implications of
a model with endogenously segmented markets (ESM) to a model representing each of the two
standard classes in the macroeconomic literature. The first class are simple incomplete mar-
kets models in the spirit of Aiyagari (1994). These models over-predict the within-group log-
consumption inequality and understate the between-group log-consumption inequality. The
second class are models with limited commitment, such as in Kehoe and Levine (1993). The
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predicted within-group consumption inequality is lower than observed (counter to models with
incomplete markets), while the between-group is higher (consistent with incomplete markets
models.)
In the ESM model, permanent income characteristics cause households to behave in a qua-
litatively different manner as costs are not proportional to income or asset purchases. Thus
access, and therefore the effect of an increase in income variance, differs across groups. This
pattern is bourne out in the data, where poorer households participate is asset markets less fre-
quently and to a smaller degree. To calibrate the model, I match the age profile of the variance
of log consumption as first reported in Deaton and Paxson (1994). The calibration results in
a modest fixed cost for market participation of $180, well within the range of estimates pro-
vided by Vissing-Jørgensen (2002). By analyzing the steady state responses to an increase
in the transient part of income variance similar to that experienced by the US from 1980 to
2004, I show that the ESM model is consistent with the data for within-group variance of log
consumption. This leads to the most important result of the paper: the observed increase in
consumption inequality understates the true welfare effect of an increase in income variance.
This is because the consumption variance of high income households decreases, while that of
low income households increases, and so any increase in aggregate consumption inequality is
driven entirely by the low-end of the income distribution. In effect, income-poor households
experience a larger increase in consumption variance than the economy as a whole.
An interesting avenue of future work is determining the effect of specific factors over which
households can differ. An example of this is the positive correlation between education and sa-
vings behaviour, conditional on income, as documented in Lawrance (1991). More specifically,
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) examine the relationship between financial education or literacy
on saving behaviour. The model can also be enriched by adding informational frictions in the
risk sharing agreement as in Athreya, Tam and Young (2008) who study the transfer of income
risk to consumption variance in unsecured credit markets. As the age income profile of con-
sumption variance has been measured over the same sample period (1980 to 1990 in each of
the studies mentioned in this paper) measuring how this changes over time may inform the di-
rection of future work, as any differences (such as later retirement, more time spent in school,
etc.) will indicate a change in some aspect of the household savings-consumption decision.
Appendix A
Supporting Tables (Chapter 2)
Table A.1: Percentage of Entrepreneurs in the U.S. Population, Various Definitions.
Cross-section Panel
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2007 2009
(1) Active Business Owner 11.6 13.4 11.6 11.7 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.4 10.8 12.7 13.2
(2) Business Owner 13.3 14.4 12.8 12.7 13.6 13.3 13.6 13.2 11.7 13.8 13.7
(3) Self-Employed 11.1 11.0 10.2 11.3 11.7 11.8 10.0 11.4 9.7 10.6 11.1
(4) Groups (1) and (3) 7.6 8.1 6.7 7.4 7.8 7.5 7.6 8.0 6.7 7.8 8.2
(5) New Entrepreneur 2.1 2.3 1.9 2.1 1.5 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.6 2.9
Note: “New Entrepreneur” is 2-or-less-year-old Active Business Owner.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Education (years) 13 13
13 13






House Value 207,072 182,730
122,000 120,000
First Mortgage 68,357 69,237
0 0
Home Equity Loans 6,145 6,837
0 0
HELOC Limit 12,119 13,133
0 0





Note: first row is the mean, second the median.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics, Workers and Entrepreneurs.
2007 2009
Worker Entrepreneur Worker Entrepreneur
Age 49 49 52 51
48 49 50 50
Education (years) 13 14 13 15
13 15 13 15
Nonfinancial Income 60,665 172,619 64,378 152,873
40,000 83,000 43,500 90,000
Assets 434,147 2,285,690 381,758 1,908,507
182,020 674,000 168,200 628,000
Debts 83,023 221,544 87,925 228,217
24,300 140,000 25,400 133,000
House Value 177,225 411,915 154,821 366,899
100,000 250,000 100,000 240,000
First Mortgage 58,075 138,929 59,407 134,107
0 92,000 0 88,000
Home Equity Loans 4,587 16,836 4,637 21,349
0 0 0 0
HELOC Limit 8,874 34,391 8,772 41,911
0 0 0 0
Home Equity 114,564 256,151 90,777 211,442
40,000 110,000 29,000 82,000
Homeownership 0.66 0.88 0.68 0.86
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
N 2,712 1,145 2,725 1,132
Notes: (1) ‘Worker’ is any non-entrepreneur; (2) first row is the mean, second the median.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Table A.5: Summary statistics, 2007 Entrepreneurs.
2007 2009
Exit Continue Exit Continue
Non-financial Income 112,067 187,230 100,485 162,690
73,000 85,200 66,900 90,000
Assets 1,240,945 2,537,786 856,009 2,169,678
479,000 771,900 321,200 693,400
Debts 174,283 232,948 147,748 243,886
112,000 145,000 76,540 142,000
House Value 289,611 441,427 249,822 389,452
185,000 275,000 175,000 250,000
First Mortgage 110,190 145,863 92,095 141,848
72,000 96,000 30,000 95,000
Home Equity Loans 9,014 18,723 8,732 23,179
0 0 0 0
HELOC Limit 16,745 38,648 14,516 43,807
0 0 0 0
Home Equity 170,408 276,840 148,996 224,424
73,000 121,000 48,000 90,000
Homeownership 0.83 0.89 0.79 0.89
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Home Loan-to-value 0.52 0.64 0.47 0.70
0.54 0.44 0.50 0.51
N 146 999 146 999
Note: first row is the mean, second the median.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Table A.6: Summary statistics, 2007 entrepreneurs who are also homeowners.
2007 2009
Exit Continue Exit Continue
Non-financial Income 124,036 198,711 114,918 172,211
86,000 90,000 80,000 94,000
Assets 1,459,693 2,732,855 1,076,663 2,357,695
500,800 841,900 390,640 746,000
Debts 200,503 254,660 177,390 269,474
149,000 164,400 117,000 170,300
House Value 350,224 494,140 317,663 436,054
241,000 310,000 205,000 284,000
First Mortgage 133,251 163,282 117,104 158,822
92,000 110,000 89,000 112,000
Home Equity Loans 10,900 20,959 11,103 25,952
0 0 0 0
HELOC Limit 20,250 43,264 18,458 49,049
0 0 0 0
Home Equity 206,072 309,899 189,457 251,279
100,000 145,000 90,000 117,000
Home Loan-to-value 0.52 0.64 0.47 0.70
0.54 0.44 0.50 0.51
N 133 942 130 948
Note: first row is the mean, second the median.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
Appendix B
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B.1 Confidence Intervals on the Coefficient of Variation
Suppose random variable X is distributed log-normal with mean µ and standard deviation
σ. We would like to construct a confidence interval on the coefficient of variation, CV =√
Var(X)/E(X). Helpfully, the coefficient of variation for a random variable distributed log-
normal does not depend on the mean and can be entirely characterized by the variance.
Begin by determining the theoretical or “true” test statistic. The following are properties of
log-normal distributions:




Var(X) = exp(2µ + σ2)(exp(σ2) − 1) (B.2)
CV =
√
exp(σ2) − 1. (B.3)




The lower and and upper bounds can be defined as follows:
aL ≡ (n − 1)s
2
Fχ2(n − 1)−1(1 − α/2)
aU ≡ (n − 1)s
2
Fχ2(n − 1)−1(α/2)
Where Fχ2(n−1)−1(1−α/2) is the cumulative distribution function for a chi-squared distribution
94
Chapter B. Supporting Material (Chapter 3) 95
with n − 1 degrees of freedom.
Using these bounds on σ2 and equation (B.3), the following is a 1 − α confidence interval






In order to compute the (1 − α)% confidence interval of the coefficient of variation, all that is
needed is the sample size, n, and the sample variance, s2.
B.2 Support for Proposition (3.4.1)
It is required to show that the probability that a firm is of good type given credit rating A or C
and any public signal is decreasing in a firm’s rating investment, i. That is,
∂Pr(g|κ, ν)
∂i
< 0 ∀ν, κ = A,C
where
Pr(g|κ, ν) = Pr(κ|g, ν)Pr(ν|g)Pr(g)
Pr(κ|g, ν)Pr(ν|g)Pr(g) + Pr(κ|b, ν)Pr(ν|b)Pr(b)
=
piκ(g, iν)Pr(ν|g)λ
piκ(g, iν)Pr(ν|g)λ + piκ(b, iν)Pr(ν|b)(1 − λ) (B.5)






κ(g)piκ(b, iν) − pi′κ(b)piκ(g, iν))Pr(ν|g)Pr(ν|b)λ(1 − λ)
(piκ(g, iν)Pr(ν|g)λ + piκ(b, iν)Pr(ν|b)(1 − λ))2 (B.6)
= Φ
Pr(ν|g)Pr(ν|b)λ(1 − λ)
(piκ(g, iν)Pr(ν|g)λ + piκ(b, iν)Pr(ν|b)(1 − λ))2 . (B.7)
To determine the sign of equation (B.7) we must determine only the sign of Φ, where
Φ = pi
′
κ(g)piκ(b, iν) − pi′κ(b)piκ(g, iν)
as all other terms and factors are positive by definition or nature. It will become evident that
the results are symmetric for each value of ν as investment, i, which may depend on ν, does not
enter the key term. As such, there are two cases to check: a good-type firm which receives a




3 = 1 for θ = g, b and σ
θ
1 > 0 for θ = g, b under
Assumptions (3.1) and (3.2).
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Case 1: κ = A






2)iν − (σb2 + σb2)(σg1 + (σg2 + σg2)iν)
= −(σb2 + σb2)σg1
< 0
Case 2: κ = C









for ratings A and C. This has implications which are discussed in Proposition (3.4.1).
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3
Proposition 3.4.3 is repeated here for the reader’s benefit.
Proposition B.2.1 Considerω1, ω2. Let R j(A, ν) be the equilibrium interest rate for firms rated
A with signal ν when ω = ω j. Then, for any ω1, ω2 such that ω1 < ω2,
R1(A, L) − R1(A,H) < R2(A, L) − R2(A,H).
Proof I first derive the derivative of the equilibrium interest rate R∗(A,H) with respect to ω and
show that R∗(A,H) decreasing in ω as this derivative is negative. Second, I derive the derivative
of the equilibrium interest rate R∗(A, L) with respect to ω and show that R∗(A, L) increasing in
ω as this derivative is positive. Recall,
R∗(κ, ν) = r
Pr(ν|g)λpiκ(g, i∗ν)γg + Pr(ν|b)(1 − λ)piκ(b, i∗ν)γb
Pr(ν|g)λpiκ(g, i∗ν) + Pr(ν|b)(1 − λ)piκ(b, i∗ν)
.
Taking the first derivative of R∗(A,H) and R∗(A, L) with respect to ω and collecting like terms:
∂R∗(A,H)
∂ω















ωλpiA(g, i∗H) + (1 − ω)(1 − λ)piA(b, i∗H)
)2
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∂R∗(A, L)
∂ω















ωλpiA(g, i∗L) + (1 − ω)(1 − λ)piA(b, i∗L)
)2 .








> 0 for θ = g, b; ν = H, L
and (γg − γb) > 0. Therefore ∂R∗(A,H)∂ω is negative and ∂R
∗(A,L)
∂ω
is positive. Finally, as R∗(A,H) is
decreasing in ω and R∗(A, L) is increasing in ω, R∗(A, L) − R∗(A,H) is increasing in ω.
Appendix C
Supporting Figures (Chapter 4)
Figure C.1: Simulated participation in complete markets and measured participation in finan-
cial markets, percentage of population, 1980-2004
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances via Wolff (2010).
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Figure C.2: The relative share of income devoted to expenditure and the relative share coming
from investment, by educational attainment.
Note: Each share relative to “No High School” share. Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey.

































































































Figure C.3: The relative share of income devoted to expenditure and the relative share coming
from investment, by income group.
Note: Each share relative to lowest income share. Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey.
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